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(Under the direction of Victoria Ekstrand) 
 
This thesis chronologically examines U.S. sex offender registration law through three 
theoretical lenses -  populist punitiveness, labeling, and performance – beginning during the 
period of Chinese Exclusion and ending in the present. Using qualitative legal and textual 
analysis research methods, this thesis explores the history of forced registration in the U.S., 
analyzes the federal and state requirements for sex offender registration and the legal 
challenges these have faced, considers areas where Fourth Amendment legal challenges may 
arise, and concludes by performing a textual analysis case study of the South Carolina sex 
offender registry. It concludes that a clear history of bigotry, political fear-mongering, and 
law enforcement performance continues to drive the expansion of registration schemes – with 
the federal government wielding the most influence in this process. The author suggests that 
state courts asserting their autonomy against increasingly punitive federal sex offender laws 
may be one path in the direction of meaningful reform. 
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“Man is an onion made up of a hundred integuments, a texture made up of many threads.” 
–– Hermann Hesse, Steppenwolf: A Novel (Eng. 1929). 
 
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION & BACKGROUND 
Introduction 
 Why Sex Offenders? The decision to research the rights (and violation of those rights) 
of sex offenders and the litany of hoops through which those convicted of sex offenses must 
jump, sparks a litany of questions from friends and family. Primarily, they’ll ask why – when 
there are so many pressing issues facing innocent, marginalized people – should scholars 
worry about the civil rights of those convicted of sex crimes? Sex offenders are ‘monsters,’ 
they may say. ‘The worst of the worst’ is a common refrain. Certainly, there are standout 
cases of vicious cruelty that come to mind when one conjures up the image of a sex offender. 
Scholars have generally agreed that the term is associated with depictions of “the ‘predatory 
sex offender’ and the ‘anonymous stranger’ who abducts, rapes and kills women and children 
[and] renders all convicted sexual offenders as ‘outcasts.’”1 People react strongly, in part, 
because sex offenders “and in particular child abusers, are repeatedly represented as the 
‘bogeyman of our age.’”2 This reaction, and the ‘moral panic’ it produces, “creates an 
environment in which issues of justice such as due process, proportionality, and privacy are 
 
1 KIRSTY HUDSON, Sex offenders’ identities and identity management, in SEX OFFENDERS: PUNISH, HELP, 
CHANGE OR CONTROL?: THEORY, POLICY AND PRACTICE EXPLORED 71–89, 71 (Jo Brayford et al. eds., 2012). 
2 Id. at 72. 
 2 
eschewed.”3 It is precisely this reaction that makes a vigorous defense of the rights of sex 
offenders so very important. 
In many ways, the treatment of ‘the worst of the worst’ (or at least those labeled as 
such) in our society exposes some of the cruelty in our legal system. If one wants to see the 
areas wherein the government takes off the kid gloves and blurs the line between safety and 
cruelty – where it stretches the bounds of constitutionality (sometimes to the point of 
breaking) – one should look to the margins of society, in places where the light doesn’t shine 
and at people for whom the public holds little compassion. “Prisoners are the canary in the 
coal mine,” says David Fathi, director of the American Civil Liberties Union’s national 
prison project.4 “When you look at how the government treats prisoners, you see what 
unchecked, arbitrary government power looks like. And it's not pretty.”5 While examples of 
this performative “populist punitiveness”6 abound, consider that in the same week that 
Charleston shooter Dylann Roof – later convicted of slaying nine people – was being held on 
$1 million bond, “a San Diego judge set bail for a man accused of taking pictures of 
preschoolers with their shirts off at $3 million.”7  
 
3 Mary Maguire & J.K. Singer, A False Sense of Security: Moral Panic Driven Sex Offender Legislation, 19 
CRITICAL CRIMINOLOGY 301–312 (2011). 
4 CJ Ciaramella, Prisons Are the Hardest Places to Read About Mass Incarceration, REASON, September 27, 
2019, https://reason.com/2019/09/27/prisons-are-the-hardest-places-to-read-about-mass-incarceration/. 
5 Id.; see also Josh Farley, The ‘Registry’ Phenomenon: How Far Should it Go?, THE KITSAP SUN, February 23, 
2011, http://pugetsoundblogs.com/kitsap-crime/2011/02/23/the-registry-phenomenon-how-far-should-it-go/ 
(citing Ohio State University Professor Douglas Berman stating that sex offenders are the canary in the coal 
mine with regard to forced registration). 
6 Anthony Bottoms, THE POLITICS AND PHILOSOPHY OF SENTENCING, IN THE POLITICS OF SENTENCING REFORM 
17–49 (Chris Clarkson & Rod Morgan eds., 1995). 
7 Judith Levine, Same-Sex Marriage Is Not Sexual Liberation, BOSTON REVIEW, June 30, 2015, 
http://bostonreview.net/blog/judith-levine-same-sex-marriage-sexual-liberation. 
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One rather unique aspect of our treatment of sex offenders is in our online, public sex 
offender registries. In the mid-1990s, the United States began down a path of publicly 
naming and shaming those in our community who had committed sex offenses, a 
performance of values that prioritized messaging over efficacy. The expansion of sex 
offender registries would ultimately lead to satellite tracking and significant privacy loss for 
nearly a million Americans. 
Under a federal mandate, states are required to maintain these registries and include 
certain information – but these minimum requirements don’t indicate any boundaries beyond 
those enshrined in the Constitution. Whereas the federal mandate “establishes a national 
baseline”8 for these programs, the official guidance from the Department of Justice 
unequivocally states that the Act “generally constitutes a set of minimum national standards 
and sets a floor, not a ceiling, for jurisdictions’ programs.”9 States, as the guidance outlines, 
are given a broad spectrum of ways to publish these registries and create their own related 
laws.10 Beyond two exceptions – requiring that states exclude victim identifying information 
and registrants’ Social Security numbers11 – “jurisdictions’ discretion to go further than the 
[mandated] minimum is not limited.”12  
The Hypothetical. In practice, the requirements of the registry and surrounding law 
often present a stark contrast even between sex offenders and similarly-classified felons. 
 








Consider a hypothetical pair of 18-year-old North Carolina residents: Abe and Barry. Neither 
Abe nor Barry has a criminal record.  
Abe is a city bus driver who is addicted to pornography and struggles with mental 
health issues. Abe downloads copious amounts of freely-available pornography to his 
personal hard drive. Some of this pornography features minors. Abe keeps all of the 
pornography on his laptop and does not share it or distribute it further. 
One day, both Abe and Barry are sitting in a local coffee shop. Barry, who knows that 
Abe keeps expensive computer equipment in his backpack, waits until Abe is in the restroom, 
picks up Abe’s unattended backpack, and walks out. The contents of the backpack are worth 
approximately four thousand dollars. Abe returns, realizes that his backpack has been stolen, 
and files a police report. 
Police use GPS tracking in the laptop to track it down – promptly arresting Barry and 
charging him with larceny, a Class H felony.13 The police open the laptop to verify that they 
have the right device – only to find the child pornography open on the screen. Abe is then 
charged with third degree exploitation of a minor (possession of child pornography), also a 
Class H felony.14  
Both plead guilty and are given relatively light sentences – between four and six 
months of either probation, community service, or incarceration (or some combination of the 
three) – and both finish their respective sentences within the year. At this point, however, 
their paths take very different turns. 
 
13 N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-72 (West 2012). 
14 N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-190.17A (West 2008). 
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Barry now has a felony record. Under the newly-enacted Second Chance Act, Barry 
fits the criteria for expunction eligibility.15 He can file a petition for expunction and, if it is 
granted (which is likely, given his lack of a prior record), it may be possible for Barry to 
completely wipe the slate clean and have his conviction sealed (viewable only by prosecutors 
in the future, not visible in public records).16 There are multiple campaigns on both the state 
and national levels to create criminal justice reform that increasingly provides opportunities 
to those with convictions.17 If Barry cannot, however, have his conviction cleared, he may 
not be able to own a firearm.18 Barry will also face social barriers in terms of finding work 
and in building personal relationships due to his conviction.19 
Abe, though, has a long road ahead. Abe is required to register as a sex offender in 
North Carolina for a minimum of 30 years. While registration is generally a ten-year 
minimum, Abe’s conviction for downloading the child pornography is considered a “sexually 
 
15 N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-145.8 (West 2019). 
16 Id. 
1791 Percent of Americans Support Criminal Justice Reform, ACLU Polling Finds, ACLU (Nov. 16, 2017), 
https://www.aclu.org/news/91-percent-americans-support-criminal-justice-reform-aclu-polling-finds (finding a 
general consensus in favor of criminal justice reform across party lines); see generally Nicholas Fandos, Senate 
Passes Bipartisan Criminal Justice Bill, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 18, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/18/us/politics/senate-criminal-justice-bill.html; see also Sarah Y. Sheppeard, 
Criminal Justice Reform: The Time Has Come, 56 TENN. B.J. 3 (Feb. 2020) (“If the ACLU, the Koch brothers 
and the Beacon Center are all supporting it, it needs to happen”). 
18 N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-415.1 (West 2011), invalidated in part by Johnston v. State, 224 N.C. App. 282, 
735 S.E.2d. 859 (2012) (holding that a criminal statute barring a felon from owning a firearm in his home was 
in violation of the Second Amendment). 
19 See generally Joan Petersilia, When Prisoners Come Home: Parole and Prisoner Reentry (2003); Jeremy 
Travis, Amy Solomon & Michelle Waul, JUSTICE POLICY CENTER, THE URBAN INSTITUTE, From Prison to 
Home: The Dimensions and Consequences of Prisoner Reentry (2001), available at 
http://www.urban.org/pdfs/from_prison_to_home.pdf; Jeremy Travis, But They all Come Back: Rethinking 
Prisoner Reentry, 7 SENT'G AND CORRECTION, ISSUES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY, no. 7, May 2000 (National 
Institute of Justice). 
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violent offense,” which triples the registration period.20 As part of his registration, he must 
provide his full name, address, birthday, identifying traits (eye color, hair color, race, height, 
weight, sex, and scars, marks or tattoos), any aliases, and his conviction information (which 
will display as “SEX EXPLOIT MINOR 3RD DEGREE” with no elaboration).21 He will 
have three mugshots –from different angles – taken by his local sheriff.22 When the sheriff 
feels that these are no longer accurate depictions, Abe will be required to come back in and 
take new mugshots.23 All of this information will be posted on the public-facing sex offender 
registry, through which the public can search and find Abe’s profile by address proximity, 
latitude and longitude, or using individual identifiers (such as Abe’s name, which he is now 
banned from changing).24  
If he fails to register or respond to an official request to update his registration, he is 
guilty of a Class F felony.25 His apartment building is across the street from an elementary 
school, and so he must now move elsewhere – he is not allowed to live within 1,000 feet of a 
school or child-care center.26 When he moves, he is required to notify the sheriff of his 
change of address – failure to do so is also a Class F felony.27 Members of the public can sign 
up for telephone or email notifications when a sex offender moves into their area, so his new 
 
20 N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-208.7 (West 2014). 
21 N.C. SBI, NORTH CAROLINA SEX OFFENDER AND PUBLIC PROTECTION REGISTRY, 
https://sexoffender.ncsbi.gov/search.aspx.  
22 N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-208.9A(a)(3a) (West 2014).  
23 Id.; N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-208.9A(c) (West 2014).  
24 N.C. SBI supra note 21; N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-202.6 (West 2008). 
25 N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-208.11 (West 2013). 
26 N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-208.16 (West 2019). 
27 N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-208.9 (West 2014). 
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neighbors may have knowledge of his criminal history before he’s even met them.28 He is 
also out of a job, as sex offenders in North Carolina are not allowed to carry the commercial 
license required for passenger vehicles.29 For the next thirty years, Abe is potentially banned 
from being within 300 feet of “any place where minors frequent,” such as libraries, arcades, 
amusement parks, recreation parks, swimming pools, and the State Fair, though this law has 
been successfully challenged and stands in a state of legal limbo.30 
Roadmap. This thesis examines how states implement their respective sex offender 
registries, how much of this is guided by federal law, state law, and judicial decisions, and 
what Fourth Amendment issues might be at play – both now and in the future. Chapter One 
of this thesis continues with a history of forced registration in the United States, which 
attempts to show the connections between the bigotry and fear-based legislation of the past 
and the modern registry. It then provides a complete legislative history of the modern federal 
mandate, which is necessary as this federal mandate – while complex – is the bedrock upon 
which all state-level registry law rests. A brief note on efficacy is included, for reference. 
After this, the work synthesizes previous literature on this issue and shows where gaps in 
scholarship exist. Chapter One concludes with the research questions addressed by this 
thesis. 
Chapter Two first describes the methodology and limitations of the study. This 
chapter then describes the theories upon which this research rests. The work dives into the 
 
28 N.C. SBI supra note 21. 
29 N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-208.19A (West 2009). 
30 N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-208.18 (West 2016), invalidated by Doe v. Cooper, 842 F.3d 833 (4th Cir. 2016) 
(holding that the language of the statute was vague and in violation of due process, and while the 300 ft 
restriction was a content neutral speech restriction under the First Amendment, it was still overbroad in 
violation of the First Amendment). 
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handful of primary theories that, as the author will suggest, drive the continued use of sex 
offender registries in the United States. The first theory is populist punitiveness, also known 
as punitive populism (with these terms being used interchangeably in the literature). The 
second is labelling theory, which looks at the impacts that labelling an individual or group 
has on the outcomes these entities experience. The third is performance theory, applied in the 
context of the government’s use of the registry to perform for the taxpayer. The registry, in 
this regard, is used to show the public that the police and politicians are doing their job by 
creating an online display of the various perceived social threats they have supposedly 
neutralized.  
Chapters Three, Four, Five, and Six each address a research question, while Chapter 
Seven discusses the findings as a whole and concludes the thesis. 
 
A History of Forced Registration in the United States 
 Bigotry and Fear. Although many of the significant scholarly backgrounds on sex 
offender registries in the United States begin in the early 1990s, when major legislation 
created a massive wave of policy shifts, the nation has a long history of forced registration. 
This section will draw a clear line between the bigoted roots of human registration in 
the United States and the current system, as well as providing a comprehensive background 
on the foundational federal mandate that serves as the framework for statewide registries 
today. It should be noted that Japanese internment won’t be used in this history, primarily 
because the registration of Japanese individuals was a by-product of internment and 
relocation, rather than a tool to enact it. 
 9 
Forced registration in the U.S. traces back to Chinese exclusion under the Geary Act 
of 1892.31 The Geary Act, an extension to the law largely prohibiting Chinese immigration 
into the United States, added a new requirement that any “Chinese person or person of 
Chinese descent” legally permitted to stay in the United States must apply for “a certificate 
of residence” that included “the name, age, local residence and occupation of the 
applicant.”32 Any person of Chinese descent (the Act uses the slur “Chinaman” numerous 
times) found without documentation was subject to deportation unless “by reason of 
accident, sickness or other unavoidable cause, he has been unable to procure his certificate,” 
proof of which required “at least one credible white witness.”33 The Act is significant for 
“requiring registration of immigrants for the first time.”34 This registration expanded. “The 
expansion of raids to European immigrant communities in New York City and beyond 
reflects the fact that, by the late 1920s, the regime of photographic identity documentation 
that had underpinned the interior enforcement of Chinese exclusion had been expanded to 
cover all immigrants, as well as naturalized citizens.”35 “The expansion of documentation 
and registration,” writes Anna Pegler-Gordon, “was closely linked to the expansion of 
deportation during the 1920s.”36 Chinese registration additionally “led to widespread 
corruption among inspectors.”37 Quite startlingly, Chinese photographic registration cards 
 
31 Geary Act (27 Stat. 25), sec. 7, and McCreary Amendment (28 Stat. 7), sec. 2. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
34 ANNA PEGLER-GORDON, IN SIGHT OF AMERICA: PHOTOGRAPHY AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF U.S. IMMIGRATION 
POLICY 6 (2009). 
35 Id. at 222. 
36 Id. at 223. 
37 Id. at 225. 
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appear to be “the first [instance of] government-issued photographic identification in the 
United States.”38 The Geary Act was repealed in part in 1943, when the Magnuson Act 
provided for Chinese immigration – though the Magnuson Act still prohibited Chinese 
property ownership.39 The Magnuson Act was not fully repealed until 1965.40 
Anti-gangster laws in Los Angeles County in the early 1930s were the next instance 
of forced registration in the United States, drawing on the Geary Act’s now-established 
tradition of registering those perceived as undesirable. Los Angeles County (and, in parallel 
proximity, the City of Los Angeles) enacted emergency statutes providing for the registration 
of all convicted felons.41 Santa Monica enacted a similar law requiring convict registration in 
response to L.A. County’s law. In the Los Angeles Times, a report noted that a unanimous 
vote by the Santa Monica City Council, “gives ex-convicts residing here just forty-eight 
hours from today’s publication of the measure in which to register at police headquarters. 
Failure to register within the prescribed time carries a penalty for each separate day’s delay, 
of a fine not to exceed $500 and a jail sentence of not more than six months, or both.”42 The 
City of L.A. registry then expanded to included sex offenses shortly thereafter. In 1940, the 
City passed Ordinance 83351, which added sex offenses to the list of registerable 
convictions. It’s important to note that the inclusion of sex crimes in the earliest registration 
schemes is believed to have been used solely to target homosexual conduct in the 1950s, as 
 
38 Id. at 13. 
39 Magnuson Act (57 Stat. 600), sec. 1. 
40 See Elaine Low, An Unnoticed Struggle, JAPANESE AMERICAN CITIZENS LEAGUE (2008). 
41 L.A. County, Cal., Ordinance 2339 (Sep. 11, 1933) (requiring all convicts with either in-state or out-of-state 
felony convictions register with the county Sheriff within 24 hours of arrival); City of Los Angeles, Cal., 
Ordinance 73,013 (Sep. 12, 1933) (a city-wide ordinance parallel to Ordinance 2339). 
42 FELON LAW PASSED BY BEACH CITY, LA. Times, Oct. 18, 1933, at 10. 
 11 
newly-registerable convictions included “sex perversions,” “crimes against nature,” and 
“lewd vagrancy.”43 Police Chief Arthur C. Hohmann “spoke favorably” to the Los Angeles 
Times in 1940 about requiring “registration of sex offenders and degenerates of all types.”44 
In the year following sex crime’s inclusion in the Los Angeles County registry, over ninety 
percent of all sex crime registrations were for consensual homosexual contact.45 Soon, the 
registry expanded to become a statewide structure46 and quickly began to spread through the 
states.47   
It should be noted that tracking ‘undesirable’ or otherwise ostracized communities 
has often come from a motivation to restrict, segregate, or ‘otherize’ these groups. Finger-
printing, for example, generally seen as a separation between individuals and their socially 
constructed groups, were originally pioneered by proponents of eugenics, such as Francis 
Galton, who believed that fingerprinting was a way to record and thereby track individuals of 
varying races.48 When Galton wrote that fingerprints were “the most important of 
anthropological data,” he implied that fingerprinting would be the “key to unlocking the code 
 
43 Ordinance 2339, supra note 41. 
44 Fingerprint Plan Before Board, L.A. Times, April 17, 1940, at A1. 
45 LAPD Ann. Rep. 28-29 (1950).  
46 Associated Press, Sex Bill Passed, LA TIMES, June 20, 1947.  
47 WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DISHONORABLE PASSIONS: SODOMY LAWS IN AMERICA, 1861-2003 (2008). 
48 Simon A. Cole, Twins, Twain, Galton, and Gilman: Fingerprinting, Individualization, Brotherhood, and 
Race in Pudd’nhead Wilson, 15 CONFIGURATIONS 227-65 (2007). 
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of heredity.”49 In his novella Pudd’nhead Wilson, Mark Twain similarly weaves fingerprints 
and race together as a central plot point.50 51 
As the next portion of this chapter will discuss, the origins of registries would become 
a wide-ranging set of surveillance systems that far surpassed the scope of these early 
registries. 
Modern Expansion. Beginning in the late 1970s, after the abduction and murder of 
six-year-old Etan Patz, concerns about ‘stranger danger’ – child abductions, milk-carton kids, 
etc. – took hold in the United States. During “a moment of unrest and uncertainty,” Paul 
Renfro describes, amid the racial backdrop of ‘post-civil rights’ eras, kindled by a 
homophobic climate and the growing culture war in America, children became the symbol of 
national innocence – and preventing their potential harm became a national performance in 
fighting for that innocence.52 In the early 1990s, sex offender registries would take center 
stage. Jacob Wetterling, an eleven-year-old boy, was kidnapped and killed on October 22, 




51 Note: for the interested reader hoping to look to earlier history, there are some fascinating studies that go back 
to the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and examine the criminalization of Egyptian identity in English law 
(used as a catch-all phrase for those of Arabic ancestry) – but these and similar studies don’t get to the heart of 
the ‘list-making’ aspect required for this work; see generally John Morgan, ‘Counterfeit Egyptians’: The 
construction and implementation of a criminal identity in early modern England, 26 ROMANI STUDIES 105-128 
(2016). 
52 PAUL M. RENFRO, STRANGER DANGER: FAMILY VALUES, CHILDHOOD, AND THE AMERICAN CARCERAL STATE 
(2020). 
53 Amy Forliti & Steve Karnowski, PMinnesota man confesses to killing of Jacob Wetterling, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS, September 6, 2016, https://apnews.com/1cbb965d61f143a08c4c224220b9be43. 
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assaulting, and murdering Jacob.54 Heinrich also admitted to sexually assaulting another 
victim around the same time period.55 Jacob’s parents, meanwhile, successfully lobbied 
Congress to enact the federal Jacob Wetterling Act. This act consisted of a series of laws 
instituting sex offender registries, which required anyone convicted of a criminal offense 
against a minor to register their current address with law enforcement officials after being 
released from the criminal justice system.56 Soon after, the Wetterling Act would become the 
catalyst for a seismic shift in public policy: Megan’s Law. 
Following the rape and murder of Megan Kanka, a seven-year-old from New Jersey,57 
the intense media focus led to additions to the Wetterling Act that effectively swallowed up 
the original act in both size and scope. This new provision, now known as Megan’s Law, 
required state compliance with the registration requirements as listed in the Wetterling Act. 
No longer an encouragement, Megan’s Law turned the Wetterling Act into a state-by-state 
requirement. Most notably, Megan’s Law made community notification mandatory – 
requiring “the release of relevant information to protect the public from sexually violent 
offenders.”58 For the first time, sex offenders were no longer simply required to report their 
whereabouts to local law enforcement, but they were now reporting to the public itself. 
 
54 Esme Murphy, Jared Scheierl Awarded Over $17M In Civil Suit Against Danny Heinrich, CBS MINNESOTA, 
November 29, 2018, https://minnesota.cbslocal.com/2018/11/29/jared-scheierl-civil-suit-danny-heinrich-jacob-
wetterling/. 
55 Id. 
56 The Jacob Wetterling Investigation: Timeline of Events, AMERICAN PUBLIC MEDIA: REPORTS (2016); Jack B 
Brooks, H.R.3355 - 103rd Congress (1993-1994): Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 
(1994), https://www.congress.gov/bill/103rd-congress/house-bill/3355/text; UNITED STATES CONGRESS, Jacob 
Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act (1994). 
57 William Glaberson, Man at Heart of Megan’s Law Convicted of Her Grisly Murder, THE NEW YORK TIMES, 
May, 1997. 
58 UNITED STATES CONGRESS, Megan’s Law (1996). 
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In 1996, Pam Lychner, a victims’ rights advocate who had narrowly escaped an 
attempted abduction years prior, was killed in a plane crash. In response to Lychner’s death, 
Congress created the Pam Lychner Act, which consolidated the patchwork of state-wide 
registries and took the project federal, adding new requirements for states to submit their 
information to a national database of sex offenders maintained by the FBI.59 Minor acts 
continued in the following years, refining and slowly expanding the scope of the new 
national system.60 
Modernizing further in 2003, the PROTECT Act mandated that all states have a 
dedicated website for searching their respective sex offender registries.61 By 2003, “all 50 
states had created online registries by which the public could easily obtain information about 
sex offenders living in their communities.”62 
Shocking crimes against children attracted media attention and were often the 
catalysts for stricter laws regarding sex offenses. In 2006, the media returned focus to the 
abduction of six-year-old Adam Walsh, who had been kidnapped and murdered in 1981.63 
Adam’s parents, who had long been pushing for reforms to the law, stood on the South Lawn 
 
59 UNITED STATES CONGRESS, Pam Lychner Sexual Offender Tracking and Identification Act of 1996 (1996). 
60 Department of Justice, Legislative History of Federal Sex Offender Registration and Notification (2020), 
https://smart.ojp.gov/sorna-archived/legislative-history-federal-sex-offender-registration-and-notification. 
61 UNITED STATES CONGRESS, Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to end the Exploitation of Children 
Today Act of 2003 (2003). 
62 Kristen M Zgoba et al., The Adam Walsh Act: An Examination of Sex Offender Risk Classification Systems., 
28 SEX. ABUSE 722–740, 723 (2016). 
63 Olivia B. Waxman, Adam Walsh Murder: The Missing Child Who Changed America | Time, TIME 
MAGAZINE, August 10, 2016. 
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of the White House – twenty-five years after their son’s murder – as President George W. 
Bush signed the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act into law.64  
The Walsh Act largely replaced the Wetterling Act and standardized Sex Offender 
Registration and Notification (SORN) requirements across the states.65 Known as SORN or 
SORNA (to include the word ‘Act’), the new law massively expanded the breadth of sex 
registries in the United States. Severity of punishment was increased across the board, new 
offenses – including non-sexual offenses – were added, mandatory minimums and statutes of 
limitations were increased, offenders were subject to more random searches, and post-
conviction civil commitment schemes were enacted, primarily in the form of GPS tracking 
programs.66 And, for the first time in this series of legislation, the bill had teeth: a state’s 
failure to comply with the new regulations risked serious financial assistance from the federal 
government.67 Since the passage of the Walsh Act, some new legislation has been passed to 
adapt the laws to the digital age – such as requiring sex offenders to provide law enforcement 
with their online identifiers and levying a one-time fine (irrespective of other penalties) of 
$5,000 for every human trafficking conviction.  
Generally, with each new bill in this space, the insistence on more information and 
less privacy for offenders has continued.68 As this legislative history suggests, the foundation 
 
64 Naomi J. Freeman & Jeffrey C. Sandler, The Adam Walsh Act: A False Sense of Security or an Effective 
Public Policy Initiative?, 21 CRIM. JUSTICE POLICY REV. 31–49, 32 (2010); UNITED STATES CONGRESS, Adam 
Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006 (2006). 
65 Zgoba et al., supra note 62 at 723. 
66 Eric M. Dante, Tracking the Constitution: The Proliferation and Legalization of Sex-Offender GPS-Tracking 
Statutes, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 1169, 1191 (2012) (“The statute authorized $5,000,000 in grants and gave a 
major financial incentive for each state to pass a sex-offender tracking statute”).  
67 UNITED STATES CONGRESS, supra note 61. 
68 UNITED STATES CONGRESS, Keeping the Internet Devoid of Sexual Predators Act of 2008 (2008); UNITED 
STATES CONGRESS, Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act of 2015 (2015). 
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of registry law can be characterized as an ever-broadening series of requirements and 
restrictions.  
Efficacy. It is worth noting here that recidivism rates of sex offenders have been 
“extensively reviewed in the literature” and said research “has indicated that not all sex 
offenders pose the same risk to communities, as some types of offenders are more likely to 
reoffend than others.”69 In fact, “recidivism rates among convicted sex offenders are 
generally low compared with those of other offenders, even accounting for the potential for 
under-reporting or low detection rates.”70 Additionally, most research has found “no 
significant reduction in recidivism due to community notification” – i.e. registries.71 
The next portion of this chapter will outline the state of literature on this topic, in 
order to suggest which gaps in the scholarship merit additional research. 
 
 
69 Freeman, supra note 64. 
70 Sarah Napier et al., What impact do public sex offender registries have on community safety?, 550 TRENDS 
ISSUES CRIME CRIM. JUSTICE 2 (2018); see also James Vess et al., International sex offender registration laws: 
research and evaluation issues based on a review of current scientific literature, 15 POLICE PRACT. RES. 322–
335, 329 (2014) (“sex offenders have been reported as having one of the lowest offense-specific reoffense rates 
(sex offenders committing new sexual offenses) in comparison to other types of offenders (e.g. robbers 
committing new robberies)”); see also R. Karl Hanson & Kelly E. Morton-Bourgon, The Characteristics of 
Persistent Sexual Offenders: A Meta-Analysis of Recidivism Studies, 73 J. CONSULT. CLIN. PSYCHOL. 1154–
1163 (2005). (noting that only one in seven sex offenders will reoffend). 
71 Jill S Levenson, David A. D’Amora & Andrea L Hern, Megan’s law and its impact on community re-entry 
for sex offenders, 25 BEHAV. SCI. LAW 587–602, 588 (2007); see also Ray Pawson, Does Megan’s Law work? A 
theory-driven systematic review, 8 ESRC UK CENTRE FOR EVIDENCE BASED POLICY AND PRACTICE (2002) 
(citing Donna D. Schram & Cheryl Darling Milloy, Community notification: A study of offender characteristics 
and recidivism, WASHINGTON STATE INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY (1995)) (finding that recidivism rates 
between two matched groups of sex offenders during both the four years before and four years after the passage 
of Megan’s Law showed no significant change); see also Elizabeth Drake & Steven Aos, Does sex offender 
registration and notification reduce crime? A systematic review of the research literature, WASHINGTON STATE 
INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY (2009) (finding no significant effect on sexual recidivism among convicted sex 
offenders as a result of SORN-related registries); see also Jill Levenson et al., Failure to Register as a Sex 
Offender: Is it Associated with Recidivism?, 27 JUSTICE Q. 305–331 (2010) (finding no difference in sex offence 
recidivism between those registered and those not registered). 
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Literature Review 
Registry Websites. Few researchers have examined the content of registry websites. 
The handful of studies in existence, however, is useful in establishing where the gaps in the 
literature might be.  
In 2002, D.B. Adams studied the administrative aspects of sex offender registry 
publication but did not substantially examine the content of the pages themselves.72 In 2005, 
Richard Tewksbury and G.E. Higgins looked at the content of the 40 state registries in 
existence at the time, looking to compare the information listed between states and regions.73 
Most common were photographs, addresses, and identifying physical features such as height, 
weight, hair color, and eye color. Additionally, the authors found that most states included 
conviction offenses, levels of risk, assumed names or aliases, offenders’ employers, profile of 
victims, vehicle descriptions, and most recent change in registry jurisdiction.74 It’s important 
to note, however, that this study was conducted prior to the passage of the Adam Walsh Act. 
Now, for example, every state is federally mandated to include a photograph of the offender, 
whereas this was not the case during Tewksbury and Higgins’ study.75 
While not directly related to the content of the registries, Christina Mancini et al. 
studied the variations of sex crime laws – including registry requirements as a subsection – 
across the U.S. in 2011.76 The authors did not dive into the content of the registries but 
 
72 D.B. Adams, Summary of state sex offender registries, 2001. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice. 
73 Richard Tewksbury & G.E. Higgins, What can be learned from an online sex offender registry site? 14 J. 
COMMUNITY CORRECT. 15–16 (2005). 
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
76 Christina Mancini, J. C. Barnes & Daniel P. Mears, It Varies From State to State, 24 CRIM. JUSTICE POLICY 
REV. 166–198 (2013). 
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examined the ranges in lengths of time required for registration. The authors found a very 
broad range of registration periods between states with eleven requiring lifetime registration 
with no distinction between offender types or offenses.77 The authors found that some states 
also went beyond registries in terms of community notification, issuing flyers, holding 
community meetings, sending out e-mails, and even calling neighbors to inform them that a 
sex offender was now residing nearby.78  
In 2012, Mary Brewster et al. conducted an analysis of the publicly accessible content 
of 51 sex offender registries (those of all 50 states and the District of Columbia).79 The study 
examined the content of the registries and identified the prevalence of certain types of data 
and along with the prevalence of search features. The authors note that “the sites varied 
greatly from state to state and many offered additional features not required [by federal 
law].”80 It should be noted that the purpose of this study was not to perform a systematic 
content analysis, but to describe the presence or absence of various features or information 
and, most notably, to determine if the content adequately fulfilled the Walsh Act mandates.81 
In 2015, Robert Lytle conducted an analysis of how sex offender registration and 
community notification varied between five Midwestern states and determined that states 
varied in their labelling of ‘dangerous,’ their use of data disclosure, and their time between 
 
77 Id. at 176. 
78 Id. 
79 Mary P. Brewster, Philip A. DeLong & Joseph T. Moloney, Sex Offender Registries, 24 Crim. Justice Policy 




legislative revisions.82 It is very instructive in its methodology and Lytle’s ability to tie the 
timing of legislation to public opinion and the resulting changes in the physical appearance of 
the registry will be incredibly useful in the textual analysis required of this study.83 
In 2019, Bradley Custer specifically looked at how many states published higher 
education status information on their respective sex offender websites.84 Custer found that 
nearly half of states have some such requirement and Custer analyzed these laws to try to 
find a pattern among them, concluding that the laws were the result of in-state political 
pressures more than they were reflections of suggested efficacy. 
The Concept of Registries. There has been very little research of sex offender 
registries from a textual analysis perspective. Ruth Simpson alludes to the framework of sex 
offender registries by supposing a neutral framework at play in which one “assumes a neutral 
background (good and/or bad) and marks items as safe or dangerous.”85 Joseph Ferrandino 
expands on this idea, noting that the sex offender registry acts in such a way: “Being on the 
sex offender registry marks one as bad, and not being listed means one has not been caught 
and thus is potentially good.”86 One way this system reduces social judgement to a binary 
good or bad is the vague level of information provided on the crimes themselves. “Offering 
scant information on the offenders and their crimes,” Ferrandino says, “but putting pictures 
 
82 Variation in Criminal Justice Policy-Making, 26 CRIM. JUSTICE POLICY REV. 211–233 (2015). 
83 Id. 
84 Bradley D. Custer, Variations in State Sex Offender Statutes: Implications for U.S. Higher Education, 30 
CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 906-924, 906 (2019). 
85 Ruth Simpson, Neither clear nor present: The social construction of safety and danger, 11 SOCIOL. FORUM 
549–562 (1996). 
86 Joseph Ferrandino, Beyond the Perception and the Obvious: What Sex Offender Registries Really Tell Us and 
Why, 27 SOC. WORK PUBLIC HEALTH 392–407 (2012). 
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and locations on the website for the world to see is one way of providing a level of 
dangerousness within society while hiding the true social reality of how the offender came to 
be on the list.”87 Elizabeth Mustaine, et al. note that sex offender registries further the belief 
in society that “sex offenders may be likely to target those in their immediate vicinity with 
whom they have frequent contacts,” which may or may not reflect the reality.88  
On the idea of government forms and databases, Lisa Gitelman writes that “[b]lank 
forms work on their face to rationalize work, but they are also one small part of the way that 
bureaucracy assumes an objective character.”89 Gitelman explains that because “blank forms 
help routinize, they dehumanize” and remove all affect from the relationship between the 
actor filling in the form and the actor collecting the form. While an individual working to 
obtain information might identify on an empathetic level with the subject, the blank form – 
filled in by the subject and returned – “merely objectifies” the subject.90 Gitelman notes that 
even blank forms that “have to do with identity do not entail identification.”91 In short, 
Gitelman describes a relationship in which subjects must conform their identity to the options 
provided – to check a box or a legal category, for example – in lieu of providing an answer 
that best describes their reality and provides context to future readers of these documents.92 
 
87 Id. at 394. 
88 Elizabeth E. Mustaine, Richard Tewksbury & Kenneth M. Stengel, Residential location and mobility of 
registered sex offenders, 30 AM. J. CRIM. JUSTICE 177–193 (2006). 
89 LISA GITELMAN, PAPER KNOWLEDGE: TOWARD A MEDIA HISTORY OF DOCUMENTS 31 (2014). 
90 Id. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. at 31-32. 
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In all, Ferrandino makes a strong argument for viewing the registry through the lens 
of a policy that should be approached from a socially realistic theory, but is, in practice, 
operated under a social constructionist paradigm.93 Ferrandino’s work is also important 
because it represents the only textual analysis of sex offender registries themselves (not 
outcomes, perceptions, etc.) to be located. There is intriguing additional literature on the use 
of criminal imagery and labeling within the world of sex offense law, but much of it focuses 
on non-registry activity, such as GPS monitoring ankle bracelets, etc., which is not specific to 
the questions this work will address.94 
Purpose 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the metaphorical ‘life cycle’ of sex offender 
registries as a way to understand the similarities and differences across states and how the 
disparities may constitute Fourth Amendment (or other Constitutional) violations. This ‘life 
cycle’ will begin with the federal mandates. The study will analyze how the federal mandates 
impact the statewide laws and how judicial decisions at both levels further impact the 
resulting implementation – the registries themselves. Thus, this study will attempt to show 
both how and why states vary in their treatment of registered sex offenders in both legislation 
and action by analyzing the registries at each stage and attempting to understand these 
complicated relationships. Finally, this study will take a broader view and consider how the 
landscape of the resulting registries squares with the Fourth Amendment privacy rights 
enshrined in the constitution. Building on this analysis, the work will also use a case study of 
 
93 Ferrandino, supra note 86 at 397. 
94 Lauren Kilgour, The ethics of aesthetics: Stigma, information, and the politics of electronic ankle monitor 
design, 36 INF. SOC. 131–146 (2020). 
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one state’s sex offender registry to show how the preceding factors and theories intertwine to 
create the consumer-facing product that is – to the public – ‘the sex offender registry.’ 
Research Questions. This thesis will address the following research questions: 
(1) What do the federal and parallel state statutes for sex offender registries require and 
why? 
(2) How have the courts interpreted these statues? 
(3) Are there existing or potential Fourth Amendment issues in this body of law? 
(4) How does a case study of one state’s sex offender registry demonstrate the 




CHAPTER TWO: METHOD & THEORY 
Methodology
Legal Research and Analysis. In order to identify the relevant statutes, cases, 
legislative history, and public guidance used in this thesis, the author referenced an array of 
secondary sources. The research began with the author reading the relevant portions of 
secondary sources and legal treatises which summarized the issue in a comprehensive way, 
such as Daniel Patrick Moylan’s overview of the federal legislative history in the 
Georgetown Journal of Gender and the Law,95 Catherine Carpenter and Amy Beverlin’s 
summary of constitutional challenges to registry laws in Hastings Law Journal,96 and the 
American Law Reports chapters on the validity of state community notification statutes.97 In 
addition, Thomson Reuters provides a 50 State Statutory Survey of sex offender registration 
laws through Westlaw, upon which the author relied heavily to find state statutes and their 
associated cases.  
In most instances, research was furthered by following chains of citations from within 
secondary sources, using the ‘Citing References’ tab in Westlaw. Extensive searching was 
 
95 Daniel Patrick Moylan, Megan’s Laws: Community Registration and Notification Laws for Sex Offenders, 1 
GEO. J. GENDER & L. 727 (2000). 
96 Catherine L. Carpenter and Amy E. Beverlin, The Evolution of Unconstitutionality in Sex Offender 
Registration Laws, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 1071 (2012). 
97 Carol Schultz Vento, Annotation, Validity, construction, and application of state statutes authorizing 
community notification of release of convicted sex offender, 78 A.L.R. 5th. 489 (Originally published in 2000); 
see also David Faigman et al, Annotated, Community registration and notification statutes—Constitutional 
challenges—The federal Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”), 2 MOD. SCI. EVIDENCE § 
10:21 (2020-2021 Edition) (providing further/current case law). 
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performed on Westlaw, using various search terms such as “sex offender registries,” “sex 
offender law,” “sex offender tracking,” “adam walsh,” “pam lychner,” “criminal registr*,” 
“ex post facto,” “fourth amendment,” “SORN*,” “state sex offender,” “registry law,” and 
combinations thereof. Boolean operators, such as asterisks, conjunctions, and exclusionary 
hyphens, were used to refine searches within Westlaw. Regarding SORNA, the original law 
has been transferred and has different citations than originally noted in most previous 
scholarship. This work has attempted to only include the most current, effective citations to 
the law as it stands today. This may cause some inconsistency between the secondary sources 
cited and this work but should not have any impact on the substance of this thesis. 
Research Questions One, Two, and Three were addressed using traditional case and 
statutory analysis to study the combination of case law and statutes that are publicly available 
and/or enacted. For much of this analysis, source documents were used directly, such as 
guidance documents from the SMART office and the Adam Walsh Act itself. 
Textual Analysis. Research Question Four is addressed by performing a textual 
analysis of the State of South Carolina’s sex offender registry website. After reviewing state 
and other jurisdictional sex offender registry websites, South Carolina was chosen as the 
vehicle for this case study for a few reasons. First, the South Carolina site is highly-
functional – lending more data and observable details. It is clear, by comparison, that South 
Carolina has placed some amount of emphasis on having a usable site and, thus, more can 
reasonably inferred abut intent: it would be harder, for example, to draw inferences about a 
state’s intent in which data is omitted, as this could be for lack of interest, political purposes, 
or simply a lack of resources. South Carolina’s choice to visibly devote the necessary 
resources to its registry site suggests, therefore, some amount of intentionality in what said 
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site chooses to display and how it does so. An array of textual analysis scholarship was 
consulted for this analysis, which the author will describe in Chapter Six as part of the 
analysis itself. 
Scope. Michelle Cohen and E.L Jeglic describe five ways in which sex offenders are 
effectively impacted by legislation and policing.98 These legal schemes are: mandatory 
sentencing laws, civil commitment, community notification, monitoring, and supervision. 
Within these five, while community notification may be conceptually self-explanatory, it’s 
important to recognize the differences between monitoring and supervision. Monitoring, in 
both the work of Cohen and Jeglic as well as this thesis, refers to the positional monitoring of 
sex offenders who are not in state custody. Most often, this involves some form of satellite-
based monitoring (SBM) – informally recognized as an ankle bracelet or other GPS tracker.99 
Supervision, meanwhile, is effectively the idea of a ‘lifetime parole’ – while offenders may 
not be corporeally monitored, they are subject to consistently having tabs kept on them 
throughout longer periods. In some states, for example, this might mean that offenders are on 
lifetime parole and must check in every six months with law enforcement. It may also mean 
mandated enrollment in treatment programs.100 For the purposes of this thesis, the author will 
only be examining community notification and, in the few instances when it is required by 
registry-specific law, supervision. Sentencing, civil commitment, and the majority of 
monitoring issues will not be examined by this thesis. The only exception to this is the Fourth 
 
98 Michelle Cohen & Elizabeth L Jeglic, Sex Offender Legislation in the United States: What Do We Know?, 51 
INT. J. OFFENDER THER. COMP. CRIMINOL. 369–383 (2007). 
99 Id. at 377-378. 
100 Id. at 378-379. 
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Amendment analysis in Chapter Five, which touches on Fourth Amendment issues found in 
the monitoring category of sex offender surveillance laws. 
Definitions. For the purposes of this work, ‘sex offender’ will generally refer to those 
convicted of sex offenses in the United States and assumed to currently be, are required to be, 
or have previously been registered as required by law. While the use of the term ‘offender’ 
carries stigma and its own communicative power, the author feels that ‘registrant’ is less 
accurate for the purposes of this work: the work will describe various parts of the registration 
process, during many of which the individuals described are not yet registered. In order to 
avoid confusion, the term offender will be used, as it ostensibly begins at the moment of 
conviction. The sex offenses described generally in this thesis are assumed to range from 
what might be considered relatively minor, non-violent crimes, to more serious crimes of 
violence. Victims are also assumed to range in age and gender. Similarly, use of ‘registries’ 
and ‘registration’ do/does not intend to include voluntary groups, support groups, or other 
rehabilitative collectives, but instead refer solely to legally-mandated enrollment in state 
and/or national systems. Unless specified otherwise, phrases like ‘the states,’ ‘states,’ or 
other similar verbiage refer to jurisdictions defined by SORNA. These also include tribal 
lands and U.S. territories. As such, any mention of ‘the states’ is intended to mean a non-
federal jurisdiction implementing its own sex offender registry. The Supreme Court of the 
United States will often be referred to as the ‘Court,’ or ‘SCOTUS’ whereas ‘courts’ will 
imply all lower courts, generally specified either in context or in the citation. In instances 
describing a specific court case, ‘the Court’ will simply mean the previously specified court 
unless otherwise noted. 
While efficacy of registries and issues of recidivism are not the focus on this work, it 
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is worthwhile to have a definition of these terms to clarify the occasional reference and create 
a baseline understanding of what these very important terms mean in debate over sex 
offender registries. When discussing efficacy, Jeffrey Sandler et al. state that “the 
overarching goal of sex offender legislation is to make communities safer and reduce the 
number of people who are sexually victimized.”101 This work will adopt a similar definition 
of efficacy: in lieu of considering communal ‘feelings’ of safety, this work will consider 
efficacy as whether or not the instruments studied, as SORN-related legislation is highly 
focused on reoffending, actually result in a decrease in recidivism among registered sex 
offenders. Recidivism, for that matter, will be defined as sex offenses occurring subsequent 
to previous conviction and registration. This distinction matters, as some zealous prosecutors 
and legislators have historically included non-sexual offenses in their recidivism rates, while 
scholars generally do not.  
Limitations. This study only consulted one legal research portal: Westlaw. 
Additionally, one limitation is access: many states do not make public their current statistics 
regarding sex offender registration. This also varies between states. When working with a 
patchwork of state laws – amidst federal mandates – there are many details that are simply 
unable to be known to researchers (if they are even fully known to the states).  
The author will attempt to ensure that personal opinion statements are clearly 
distinguished from analytical statements and that analytical statements are supported by 
further evidence and/or are facially accurate. As it relates to biases, the author does not have 
any personal connection to the subject being analyzed (no close friends or family members 
 
101 Jeffrey Sandler,  Naomi J. Freeman, & Kelly M. Socia, Does a watched pot boil? A time-series analysis of 
New York State’s sex offender registration and notification law, 14 PSYCHOLOGY, PUBLIC POLICY, AND LAW, 
284, 299 (2008). 
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on any registry, not a registrant himself, etc.).  
Theory 
 Populist Punitiveness / Punitive Populism. There are a few theories that underpin this 
work, and which have guided the research. First among these is the concept of populist 
punitiveness, first coined by Anthony Bottoms in 1995. This theory describes the 
phenomenon of politicians drawing on a public moral stance and using it to their advantage – 
often at the expense of a particular group or individual. In the instance of sex offenders, there 
is no question that this arises from what Stanley Cohen describes as a ‘moral panic.’102 Mary 
Maguire and J.K. Singer build on this concept, defining the moral panic as the phenomenon 
that occurs when a minority group threatens the status quo of those in power.103 In this 
instance, it is reasonable to assume that this perceived threat is a physical one, wherein the 
majority feel unsafe due to the actions of some in the minority group – i.e. sexual assault. As 
for the moral panic that arose in the 1990s, Renfro describes, a growing concern about 
‘stranger danger’ in the late 1970s and through the 1980s, in which American culture had 
projected its racial and sexual anxieties – and anxieties about social change in general – onto 
a mythical epidemic of “deviant strangers emboldened by sexual liberation.”104 While there 
were relatively few of these cases, the ‘sex panic’ took the nation by storm.105 
This is, in part, a product of media coverage. Scholars exploring the coverage of sex 
offenders, for example, have noted that the American media has “moved from [the position] 
 
102 STANLEY COHEN, FOLK DEVILS AND MORAL PANICS: THE CREATION OF THE MODS AND ROCKERS (2002). 
103 Maguire, supra note 3. 
104 Renfro, supra note 52, at 7. 
105 Id. 
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of simply reporting events [regarding sex offenders] to one of instigating and exacerbating 
more extreme public reaction.”106 Renfro describes a media saturation that “breathed life into 
the discourse of missing children and child protection.”107 “Rare, isolated cases of missing 
and endangered youth – news of which traveled via television, newspapers, and political 
rhetoric – together generated an easily digestible composite of imperiled (white) childhood 
that confirmed fears of familial and national decline.”108 Others have highlighted how 
visceral the reaction of the public can be to these stories, causing rage in the streets and 
creating notable tales of infamous offenders.109 One effect of this, according to some, is that 
all registered sex offenders are framed as monstrous – committing heinous and lurid crimes – 
allowing unregistered predators to remain under the radar. “Current media rhetoric 
therefore,” writes Kirsty Hudson, “ignores the more typical sex offender and, in doing so, 
renders real offenders ‘invisible.’”110 
 Public support, perhaps influenced by such media coverage, may also be what allows 
for populist punitiveness to thrive. Rates of support for public registries, for example, 
generally exceed 75 percent across the country.111 Further, the vast majority of Americans – 
 
106 Hudson, supra note 1, at 53. 
107 Renfro, supra note 52, at 15. 
108 Id. 
109 TERRY THOMAS, SEX CRIME: SEX OFFENDING AND SOCIETY 19 (2nd ed. 2005); see EAMONN CARRABINE, 
CRIME, CULTURE, AND THE MEDIA (2008).  
110 Hudson, supra note 1, at 72. 
111 See Yolanda Nicole Brannon et al., Attitudes About Community Notification: A Comparison of Sexual 
Offenders and the Non-offending Public, 19 SEX. ABUS. A J. RES. TREAT. 369–379 (2007); Andrew J. Harris & 
Kelly M. Socia, What’s in a Name? Evaluating the Effects of the “Sex Offender” Label on Public Opinions and 
Beliefs, 28 SEX. ABUS. A J. RES. TREAT. 660–678 (2016); Sarah Koon-Magnin, Perceptions of and support for 
sex offender policies: Testing Levenson, Brannon, Fortney, and Baker’s findings, 43 J. CRIM. JUSTICE 80–88 
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between 60 and 90 percent – believe (without evidence) that public notification reduces sex 
offender recidivism and makes them feel safer.112 It is no surprise then, that such a moral 
panic – and the subsequent populist punitiveness – begins to arise. This state of panic 
“creates a background effect of ‘collective anger’ and a ‘righteous demand for retribution.”113 
This ‘righteous demand’ is often followed by a series of moral regulations brought on by the 
social anxiety.114 These regulations are likely to be “based not on meticulous policy 
evaluation, but instead, on societal demand … in an effort to assuage the fear of the 
masses.”115 To make matters worse, the confusion about sex offenders and whether they are 
diseased, have mental disorders, or are curable versus incurable can often cause sex offenders 
to be controlled in harsher ways than the reality might merit.116 Often the “emotional charge 
in the passage of these laws ensured that there was little-to-no regard to the harmful impacts 
that the registry and community notification might have on sex offenders.”117 
 Finally, after salacious media coverage, widespread belief that harsher punishment is 
effective, popular anger and a demand for retribution, amid a general confusion about sex 
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offenders as a group, populist punitiveness rears its head. “Many of the current sex offender 
laws,” writes James Vess et al., “appear to be a direct response to horrific sexual crimes, 
most often resulting in the death of the victim. Policymakers may subscribe to some of the 
common misconceptions about sexual offenders, and promote legislation that is not 
consistent with the available empirical evidence.”118  
 Labeling Theory. One concept that may be useful as a theoretical underpinning of the 
problem with registries is labeling theory. Tannenbaum is regarded by many as a founding 
mind of labeling theory, the idea that by labeling someone, there’s every chance that “the 
person becomes the thing he is described as being.”119 “Social identity is our understanding 
of who we are and of who other people are, and reciprocally, other people’s understanding of 
themselves and others (which include us).”120 This identity, of course, is influenced by how 
we are labeled – either by ourselves or by others.121 
Criminal labeling has numerous deleterious effects on future delinquency.122 While 
the labeling process has an important function in society, allowing society to “cultivate its 
identity” by applying the label to ‘otherize’ the deviant group and thereby reaffirm the 
community’s moral order and identity, “the applied ‘label’ permits society to distrust, 
degrade, and segregate deviants” from its ranks.123 “Empirical research,” one scholar notes, 
 
118 Vess, supra note 70, at 329. 
119 FRANK TANNENBAUM, CRIME AND COMMUNITY 20 (1938); but see Reza Barmaki, On the Origin of 
“Labeling” Theory in Criminology: Frank Tannenbaum and the Chicago School of Sociology, 40 DEVIANT 
BEHAV. 256–271 (2019) (refuting Tannenbaum as the founder of labeling theory). 
120 RICHARD JENKINS, SOCIAL IDENTITY (1996). 
121 Gwenda M. Willis, Why call someone by what we don’t want them to be? The ethics of labeling in 
forensic/correctional psychology, 24 PSYCHOL. CRIME LAW 727–743 (2018). 
122 Id. (citing numerous research studies showing negative effects of criminal labeling) 
123 Griffin, supra note 115, at 4. 
 32 
“has accumulated showing that formal labelling of persons who have engaged in delinquent 
or criminal behavior increases risk for future delinquency or crime, for example, through 
identity changes, blocked opportunities and increased association with deviant peers.”124 
Specific to sex offenders, “individuals with a conviction of a sexual offense [are] 
acutely aware of how the public perceive[s] them” and that, to both the public and the 
offenders, it is “no longer the sex offenders’ crimes that are unacceptable, but the sex 
offenders themselves.”125 The stigma and label associated with being a sex offender goes 
beyond the traditional definition and exists as an ‘extended social identity’ that is internalized 
by the individual and is unable to be isolated as a single facet of their identity by either 
themselves or the public.126 The label becomes “central to their individual and social 
identities.”127 “Regardless of guilt or innocence or the crime for which they were convicted, a 
legal determination that an individual has committed a sexual offense permanently changes 
his or her social identity.”128 The use of these terms about a person’s past “presumes that we 
can infer from that past something that is true and meaningful about who a person is today--
and not just something, but that it becomes one's central identity, the most relevant thing 
about them.”129 Thus, labeling someone as a ‘registered sex offender,’ therefore, 
“contradicts” a goal of “pro-social identity changes … in the process of desistance from 
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crime.”130 Simply put, there may be some very good-sounding reasons to label criminality, 
but the effects of the actual labeling often hinder the goals stated by those in favor of such 
labeling.131 If this is the case, however, the question must be asked: why do we use sex 
offender registries to label sex offenders, given that it is at odds with rehabilitation? As 
Gwenda Willis asks, “why call someone by what we don’t want them to be?”132 The answer 
to this question may lie in performance theory. 
Performance Theory.  This theory, when applied to sex offender registries, suggests 
that the use of the registry furthers the goals of politicians and law enforcement agencies 
through its use as a performative strategy – a tool in which the government and its agencies 
demonstrate their worth and justify or request resources by framing problems, consequences, 
and remedies (residing within office of government). Literature relating to police 
performance, for example, show that crime and disorder reduces confidence in police. This is 
basic, of course, but the framing here is what matters: disorder, under this theory, is a 
performance of the police’s ineffectiveness or inaction.133 But what is this ‘performance?’ 
Performance theory, at its core, is the concept that our decisions and actions – from 
the words we choose, to our haircut, to whether we have our morning coffee (and where we 
get that coffee), are all performances to signal judgments to ourselves and others. If we 
choose to eat cake for breakfast, perhaps we are signaling to ourself that we’ve earned a little 
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indulgence. Perhaps we are trying to remind our spouse that today is our birthday. Erving 
Goffman first adapted the concept of dramaturgy from the world of theater to the world of 
sociology, as performance theory, in his 1956 book, The Presentation of Self in Everyday 
Life,134 and since then this concept has been used to explain phenomena across disciplines. 
This concept of performance theory was later expanded by feminist scholar Judith Butler, 
who proposed that gender itself is performative.135 Notably, this performance of gender isn’t 
necessarily theatrical, but conveys and reinforces identities and where they sit in hierarchies 
of power.136 This applies to the sex offender registry, though indirectly, as well. Registries 
arguably reinforce the identities and hierarchy among those involved – the citizen viewer as 
above the sex offender subject, with the authoritative law enforcement agency as the 
presenter of fact. 
Further, the issue of sex offender registries spills over into both performance theories: 
micro-performance theory, which is concerned with the services provided by an institution, 
and macro-performance theory, which supposed that trust in institutions comes from more 
general phenomena.137 For example, both groups of performance theorists would view the 
work of a fire department as performative to the community: the fire department likely 
operates in a way that is ultimately intended to build trust in the fire department. On top of 
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the job they do in the community, many departments participate in community events (e.g., 
trucks in parades), and firetrucks are often on display near firehouses – clean, shiny, and 
well-maintained – among other examples. A micro-performance theorist, however, would 
view the services provided and their quality – how quickly and effectively fires are put out, 
how fast the fire trucks respond, etc. – as being the indicators for judging the fire 
department’s performance. A macro-performance theorist would likely view the general 
sentiment and trends – a sense that there have been a lot of fires recently, that firefighters are 
generally good people, general trust in the government, etc. –  as the indicators for judging 
the department’s performance. In the case of sex offender registries, micro-performance 
theorists would view the performative nature of such registries as the service provided for the 
community either through its maintenance (the service of keeping the website up and 
running) or through the performance of its accomplishments (as a public record of the 
individual services provided through arresting and monitoring sex offenders). Meanwhile, 
macro-performance theorists might also view the registry as an indicator of performance 
because it emphasizes a supposed threat that it performatively claims is both looming, yet 
actively being addressed as a larger issue.  
Performance, moreover, is important for institutions: Boukaert et al. suggest that the 
public’s perception of institutional performance is as real to the people as real to people as 
the institution’s actual performance.138 And the police know this as well. “Police departments 
actively construct public images of themselves,” writes Steven Chermak, “[and] the level of 
success achieved by police departments, when attempting to dictate a positive media image 
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of themselves, affects how others define their role in society.”139 Chermak notes that police 
use media to “legitimate their role in society.”140 In an article pre-dating the public-facing sex 
offender registry, Chermak describes police departments working with news outlets as 
having “taken advantage of the opportunity to cut media costs, influencing their presentation 
in the news and securing public and political support in the process.”141 This work, in 
analyzing one state’s sex offender registry, will examine whether this concept of 
manipulable, performative media is perhaps being utilized by police departments in the way 
they present their sex offender registries. 
But how do these theories of populist punitiveness, labeling, and performance all 
collide? By using our societal outrage to label the group of our scorn – and then 
performatively punish and stigmatize this group – “sex offenders are disqualified from full 
social acceptance because of their mark of infamy that is difficult to hide or disguise,” writes 
Griffin et. al. “If the stigma associated with an individual becomes too difficult to manage, 
the individual may surrender to the stigma by allowing it to become salient to their identity,” 
which in turn could result in the individual reoffending.142 
This work will call upon these theories further during the process of addressing each 
research question, though these theories will most prominently come into play during the 
analysis of Research Question Four, in which the author will look at the performative nature 
of one state’s sex offender registry website. To get to that point, though, it is important to 
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understand the background of such a website, beginning with what the federal and state laws 
require of jurisdictions’ public-facing registry websites and the registration requirements for 
offenders themselves. Chapter Three will address this background and attempt to answer 
Research Question One.  
 
 38 
CHAPTER THREE: WHAT DO STATE AND FEDERAL STATUTES FOR SEX 
OFFENDER REGISTRIES REQUIRE AND WHY? 
The federal government requires that those convicted of federal sex offenses register 
in their respective states (this extends to states where they reside, study, or work).143 Thus, 
Congress created a national system that – in part – provides specific requirements for various 
aspects of this registration.144 This system – and the registry requirements – applies to federal 
sex offenders who had already completed their sentences when SORNA became law.145 This 
chapter will detail the myriad list of requirements – for both the offenders and their 
respective jurisdictions – that SORNA mandates. The chapter will briefly describe SORNA’s 
potential influence on subsequent state law and will also describe the patchwork of state and 
territorial laws that have emerged since SORNA’s passage. 
What Does SORNA Require? 
 Three Tiers. SORNA creates a three-tiered system of categorizing sex offenders.146 
These tiers determine minimums in terms of duration of registration, frequency of in-person 
appearances, and – in the case of the lowest tier – whether or not their information can 
potentially be exempted from website disclosure. Beginning with the most ‘serious,’ Tiers II 
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and III potentially apply to any offender whose convicted offense is punishable by 
imprisonment for more than one year in their jurisdiction.147 Tier II largely concerns offenses 
against or which exploit minors (ranging from sexual contact with a minor to distribution of 
child pornography).148 Tier III concerns what might universally be considered the more 
egregious offenses, such as aggravated sexual abuse, abuse of minors below the age of 13, 
and kidnapping of a minor. Tier III also includes recidivists and those with registration 
offenses. For example, any Tier II offender that fails to register – if that failure to register 
offense is punishable by one year imprisonment or longer – becomes a Tier III offender.149 
Federal Requirements. Offenders must register in each jurisdiction where the 
offender resides, where they are an employee, and where they are a student.150 For example, 
if our hypothetical offender – Abe – lives and works in North Carolina, but studies in South 
Carolina, he must register as a sex offender in both states. New offenders must register either 
before their sentence of imprisonment, if they are to be incarcerated, or within three business 
days after being sentenced, if they will not be incarcerated.151 New offenders must also, for 
initial registration purposes, register in the jurisdiction in which they were convicted if this 
differs from their other applicable jurisdictions.152 For example, if Abe is convicted in 
Colorado – though he lives/works in North Carolina and studies in South Carolina – he must 
also initially register in Colorado. Jurisdictions are required to inform new offenders (either 
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immediately after sentencing or shortly before their release from custody) of the duties of sex 
offenders under the law, explain those duties, require offenders to read and sign a form 
affirming their understanding of these duties, and ensure that the offender is registered.153 
If an offender seeks to change their name, residence, employment, or student status, 
they must appear in person in at least one of their applicable jurisdictions within three 
business days of the change and inform authorities of all changes.154 That jurisdiction then 
informs all other applicable jurisdictions of the changes.155 
Offenders must keep their registration current in each of these applicable jurisdictions 
and SORNA requires states to provide a criminal penalty for failure to register that is no less 
than one year and no greater than ten years imprisonment.156 Offenders must appear in 
person to verify their information and take a current photograph either yearly, every six 
months, or every three months, depending on their level of sex offense.157 Offenders must 
also report their intended international travel information to their respective jurisdictions or 
face a fine, up to ten years imprisonment, or both.158 
SORNA requires each jurisdiction to collect an array of information about each 
offender for use in its sex offender registry. Jurisdictions must collect all names, aliases, and 
remote communication identifiers and addresses.159 These include nicknames, e-mail 
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addresses, and instant messaging usernames.160 Jurisdictions must collect all telephone 
numbers, dates of birth, social security numbers, residential addresses, temporary lodging 
(any place in which the offender is staying for seven or more days), driver’s licenses or 
identification cards, and travel and immigration documents (such as passports).161 
Jurisdictions must also collect the names and addresses of offenders’ employers – including 
any place the offender volunteers or otherwise works without remuneration – and any 
professional licenses the offender holds.162 As stated earlier, jurisdictions must collect school 
information on each offender (at any level of education), with the exception of online-only 
courses.163 Jurisdictions must collect vehicle information – the license plate and a description 
of any vehicle owned or operated by the offender – with the exception of employers’ rotating 
fleets.164 For example, North Carolina does not have to require Abe to supply the license 
plate information of every city bus he drives as an employee. If he were a long-haul trucker 
assigned primarily to a single truck, however, he would need to supply that information to 
the state. Other required information includes a physical description of the offender, the text 
of the offense (the law that the offender is convicted of breaking), the offender’s criminal 
history, a current photograph, fingerprints, palm prints, and the offender’s DNA.165 
As for what information is required to be publicly displayed on sex offender registry 
websites, SORNA states that jurisdictions are required to “make available on the Internet, in 
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a manner that is readily accessible to all jurisdictions and to the public, all information about 
each sex offender in the registry.”166 Mandatorily exempted from this requirement – the 
broad category of “all information” – are the identities of any victims, offender social 
security numbers, arrests not resulting in a conviction, and travel and immigration document 
numbers.167 
There is also a group of discretionary exemptions – scenarios in which the 
jurisdictions can choose not to display certain information.168 The first exemption is for Tier I 
sex offenders. As described earlier, Tier I is what the statute considers to be low-level 
offenders. Thus, jurisdictions can choose not to display any information about its lowest-
level sex offenders whose offenses do not involve minors.169 The second exemption is for 
information about offenders’ employers and the third exemption is for information about 
where the offender is a student (though an offender studying in a state must still register in 
that state).170 
Additionally, SORNA requires that all registry websites include links to safety and 
education resources, instructions on how to seek correction of erroneous information, and a 
warning that information on registry websites should not be used to harass, injure, or commit 
a crime against registered individuals.171 
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In general, SORNA requires that offenders in Tier I must keep their registration 
current for 15 years, though jurisdictions have discretion to reduce this minimum period by 5 
years for any Tier I offender who has maintained a ‘clean record’ for 10 years. This ‘clean 
record’ requires an offender to have no additional offenses (including non-sex-related 
offenses) punishable by more than one year imprisonment, no further sex offenses 
(regardless of whether it is punishable by imprisonment of a year or more), successful 
completion of all supervised release, probation, or parole, and completion of an appropriate 
sex offender treatment program.172 
Tier II offenders are required to keep their registration current for 25 years, with no 
opportunity to lessen this minimum on the basis of a clean record.173 Tier III offenders, 
meanwhile, are required to maintain their registration for life – with the only potential for 
reduction of this minimum being for offenses committed as a minor.174 All adult Tier III 
offenders – including those ‘upgraded’ to Tier III from Tier II for failure-to-register 
convictions – must have lifetime registration.175 
SORNA’s Influence. SORNA’s three-tiered system of offenders is, arguably, the 
system through which the federal government makes over-punishment and one-size-fits-all 
surveillance the path of least resistance for its jurisdictions. The federal government has 
created mandatory minimums that have complicated criteria – with the knowledge that state 
systems can often be overburdened in administering these programs. As an example, Jamie 
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Markham created a comprehensive attempt to divide and place one state’s sex offenses 
within each federal tier.176 Despite creating a series of rules for the effort and consulting 
additional attorneys, Markham found that while some offenses were “straightforward” to 
categorize, some “were much more complicated.”177 The proper tiering of one offense “has 
been an issue in several reported appellate cases in North Carolina – and the ultimate answer 
is still open to debate.”178 In order to counter this kind of complexity, the federal government 
encourages states to create statewide minimums that are all-encompassing: there’s no reason 
to fret about whether an offender is Tier II or Tier III, for example, if a state mandates that all 
offenders that are not in Tier I must register for life. The federal guidelines seemingly 
support this overbroad classification approach outright. “For example,” the guidelines state, 
“suppose that a jurisdiction decides to subject all sex offenders to lifetime registration, 
quarterly verification appearances, and full website posting … That would meet the SORNA 
requirements with respect to sex offenders satisfying the [Tier III] criteria … Hence, such a 
jurisdiction would be able to implement the [requirements] with respect to all sex offenders 
without any labeling or categorization, and without having to assess individual registrants 
against the tier criteria in the SORNA definitions.”179 The guidelines go on to encourage 
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“any other approach a jurisdiction may devise” as long as the jurisdictional requirements for 
each Tier “meet or exceed” the SORNA requirements.180 
The federal government has also issued additional guidelines related to SORNA 
which include, in part, the fact that “jurisdictions’ discretion to go further than the SORNA 
minimum is not limited.”181 The guidance repeats, in nearly every section, some variety of 
this mantra (e.g., “As with other SORNA requirements, jurisdictions may require in-person 
appearances by sex offenders with greater frequency than the minimum required”). The 
guidance goes so far as maintain that jurisdictions “may wish” to keep an offender’s 
information live on its registry website even when the offender has died, that said 
information “may remain of value” and promptly follows with the note that any minimums 
outlined “do not limit, and are not meant to discourage, adoption by jurisdictions of more 
extensive or additional measures” in their surveillance of offenders.182 
What do the States Require?  
A Patchwork of Laws. It should first be noted that many states/jurisdictions do not 
meet the SORNA requirements in some aspect.183 In 2020, the Department of Justice Office 
of Sex Offender Sentencing, Monitoring, Apprehending, Registering, and Tracking 
(SMART) released a “State and Territory Implementation Progress Check,” in which it found 
that 28 jurisdictions did not meet SORNA requirements as to which offenses and offenders 
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absconders, 26 did not meet SORNA’s community notification requirements, 29 did not meet 
the appearance and verification standards, and 17 did not meet the information sharing 
requirements.184 Four jurisdictions satisfied none of the categories reviewed while 22 
jurisdictions satisfied all five areas of review.185 It should be noted that four of the five 
territories satisfied every area of review with Puerto Rico satisfying all but one of the 
categories.186 This does not, however, imply that states are not actively increasing their 
surveillance of offenders. As of 2018, at least two-thirds of all registered sex offenders were 
subject to registration requirements for 25 years or life.187 
 Research on sex offender statutes has shown that these can “vary widely between 
states.”188 The most recent analysis of these statutes occurred in 2011, when Mancini et al. 
examined the extent of variation in registries, community notification policies, residence 
restriction policies, civil commitment schemes, lifetime supervision, driver’s license 
markings, and chemical castration.189 While there was no variability in the existence of 
registries (as each state is required to maintain a registry) or community notification, there 
was variation in each of the other categories. The authors concluded that states varied in the 
severity of their sex offender statutes but could not observe a clear pattern as to what might 
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examination of registration and community notification policies of five Midwestern states in 
2015 and found that states often differ in their definitions of sexual predators, juvenile 
registration, and which offenses require registration.191 All five states varied in their 
frequency of policy changes, with 89 percent of that variation occurring from in-state 
pressures and politics.192 Most recently, Custer examined the higher education reporting 
requirements nationwide and found that 20 states have higher-education-specific 
requirements for offenders, with 10 unique rules found across these 20 states, and that 31 
states and territories listed names or addresses of the institutions where offenders work or 
study.193 Nine websites allowed users to search for registrants by institution.194 The author 
notes that this may be at odds with evidence that higher education may be rehabilitating and 
reduce recidivism.195 Custer also comments on the variability of sex offender statutes 
between states, noting that “there may be unintended consequences of each state having a 
unique combination of sex offender laws.”196 
 Adjacent Laws. Additionally, it is important to briefly mention the sex offender laws 
enacted by states and territories that – while they are not directly ‘registry’ laws – still 
involve the surveillance of sex offenders: chiefly GPS location tracking. As these are not the 
focus of this work, they will not be examined in great detail or analyzed as part of this thesis. 
They are, however, still relevant to provide the context of near-total surveillance to which 
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registered sex offenders across the nation are subjected. This area of research deserves more 
inquiry but is too broad and complex for the scope of this work. 
At this time, “more than forty U.S. states currently track at least some of their 
convicted sex offenders using GPS devices,”197 and at least thirteen “have introduced lifetime 
supervision policies.”198 Most states use one of three primary models of GPS-tracking, often 
referred to as satellite-based monitoring (SBM).199 The Florida Model generally requires 
electronic monitoring “when an offender who committed an enumerated crime is on 
probation after incarceration” and is the most prevalent form of SBM.200 The California 
Model, meanwhile, represents one of the harshest statutory models. Unlike the Florida 
Model, which has clear limits on lifetime monitoring, the California Model mandates lifetime 
SBM for any offender, regardless of individual risk or when the crime occurred, who 
committed certain offenses. Additionally, the California Model requires offenders to pay for 
their tracking costs. The California Model is the second-most prevalent model in the United 
States. Finally, the Massachusetts Model allows judicial discretion for determining the length 
of probation, but mandates SBM for the entirety of that probation period for certain sex 
crimes. Additionally, those on parole for specific acts must also be monitored via SBM for 
the duration – including those on lifetime parole.201 
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In summary, the vast majority of clear-cut rules originate in the federal mandate. This 
mandate – and the guidance that comes alongside it – encourages jurisdictions to lean toward 
over-classification with broad, sweeping regulations. It often suggests that states ‘may’ do 
things that the law does not require, with a wink-and-nod towards harsher punishment and 
increased surveillance. The states, meanwhile, are hard to pin down – many have expanded 
these rules, though many have clearly opted for parallel paths that do not conform to the 
specific standards required by SORNA. In essence, the federal government has told the states 
to a) be as harsh as they’d like (with the Constitution being the only guard rail) and b) to 
follow its complicated and administratively burdensome guidelines. The jurisdictions, for 
their part, have largely followed the first instruction, but many have ignored or outright 
refused to follow the second. Chapter Four will outline how the legislative goals of the 
federal government and the jurisdictions have collided with the harsh reality of the U.S. 
Constitution and individual state constitutions – and how this collision has shaped the current 
landscape of sex offender registry policy across the nation. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: HOW HAVE THE COURTS INTERPRETED THESE 
STATUTES? 
Challenges 
This chapter will survey some of the key cases and legal decisions that surround 
registries. There are not many landmark cases directly tied to registries, but there are patterns 
that this section will outline. Within the world of legal scholarship, there are lively debates 
about the constitutionality of public notification,202 privacy rights,203 adverse consequences 
(both to the public at large and the sex offender population),204 and whether or not registries 
and the like are forms of ex post facto punishment – with the lion’s share focusing on the 
latter.205  
These debates are not confined just to scholarship, however. The Department of 
Justice (DOJ) notes that “offenders have launched unsuccessful [legal] challenges based on 
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the following arguments: takings, double jeopardy, procedural due process, substantive due 
process, equal protection, the right to a trial by jury, right to travel, cruel and unusual 
punishment, full faith and credit, the supremacy clause, separation of powers, and federalism 
concerns.”206 This laundry list of citations is intentional, as it goes to illustrate that very few 
challenges to SORN-related or adjacent laws are successful. 
Ex Post Facto. The ex post facto clause of the United States Constitution prohibits 
punitive laws with retroactive force.207 It’s important to note that retroactive force does not, 
in most of the cases that have appeared on this issue, necessarily arise because the individual 
was convicted of their sex offense prior to the passage of the state’s SORN-adjacent registry 
laws. While that was an extensive issue upon SORNA’s passage years ago, more recent 
challenges come from registered sex offenders who argue that amendments or expansions of 
existing registry-related law are retroactive punishments for crimes they committed prior the 
‘updated’ regulations. Going back to our hypothetical, Abe might have a claim upon the 
original passage of the Adam Walsh Act, but he might also argue that every new increase and 
rule that is added to the law – even if the original law existed at the time of his conviction – 
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constitutes a new restriction (and, in many cases, these amendments do create very real 
restrictions) that extends to the point of punishment. The key to ex post facto claims, of 
course, is the element of punishment. The Supreme Court created a two-pronged, seven-part 
“intent-effects” test in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez to determine if a regulation was 
punitive in nature.208 In Smith v. Doe, a landmark case in 2003, the Court relied on the 
Mendoza-Martinez test and found that a challenge to SORN as a violation to the ex post facto 
clause did not have merit. Directly addressing “whether the registration requirement is a 
retroactive punishment prohibited by the Ex Post Facto Clause,” the Court held that because 
SORN (in this case the Alaska State parallel law) “is nonpunitive, its retroactive application 
does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.”209  
The Smith v. Doe decision had an immediate ripple effect across the states, for 
multiple reasons. California’s reversal of significant case law is one example. Twenty years 
prior to Smith, in 1983, In re Reed, a case before the Supreme Court of California, had 
challenged the mandatory registration of someone convicted for misdemeanor disorderly 
conduct after he masturbated in front of an undercover vice officer in a public restroom.210 
The court in Reed had held that the mandatory application of the relevant sex offender 
registration statute constituted cruel and unusual punishment in this instance due to the 
punitive nature of registration.211 At the time of Reed, only five states maintained sex 
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offender registries.212 In the year following Smith v. Doe, however, the California Supreme 
Court relied on the SCOTUS ruling when it decided In re Alva, wherein it overruled Reed 
and held that registration itself could not be considered a form of cruel and unusual 
punishment.213 The Alva court referenced the Smith rationale, that registration is a 
nonpunitive practice, by stating that Smith had “confirmed beyond doubt” the nonpunitive 
nature of registration.214 In short, Smith not only has an impact on similar ex post facto 
claims, but also cruel and unusual punishment claims: how could new challengers argue that 
sweeping registration laws constituted cruel and unusual punishment if the Supreme Court’s 
reasoning in the ex post facto challenges relied on the fact that the Court viewed such 
sweeping registration laws as not even rising to the level of punishments at all? 
Since 2003, federal courts have overwhelmingly continued down the path of Smith, 
with ex post facto challenges falling flat in the First, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits.215 A Sixth 
Circuit decision in 2012 flatly stated that there is a “unanimous consensus among the circuits 
that SORNA does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.”216 State Supreme Courts in Idaho, 
Wyoming, and Rhode Island, among others, have stood behind Smith, finding that their 
respective state’s implementation of SORNA did not violate the ex post facto clause.217 As 
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sex offender regulation statutes have been deemed nonpunitive in nature by the Supreme 
Court, “states are free to restrict sex offenders in ways that would be constitutionally 
impermissible if applied to almost any other group of people.”218  
There have been, however, some recent signs of a potential judicial shift in this area. 
In 2016, in Doe v. Snyder, six registered sex offenders challenged expansions of Michigan’s 
sex offender statutes on a number of grounds, including ex post facto.219 The Sixth Circuit 
Court of Appeals first agreed, in part, with Smith, holding that the intent of the law was not 
punitive.220 On the issue of whether or not the “actual effects” were punitive, however, the 
Court distinguished the Michigan case from Smith in a blistering rebuke, referring to the 
state’s sex offender registry program as “a byzantine code governing in minute detail the 
lives of the state’s sex offenders”221 and noted that the state’s sex offender laws “resemble 
traditional shaming punishments.”222 Unlike Smith, the Court found the combined 
impositions of registration, surveillance and location-based restrictions to be direct restraints 
on personal conduct under the same Mendoza-Martinez test applied by SCOTUS in Smith. 
When the state argued that such restraints were “minor and indirect,” the Court countered by 
stating that “something is not ‘minor and indirect’ just because no one is actually being 
lugged off in cold irons bound. Indeed, those irons are always in the background since failure 
to comply with these restrictions carries with it the threat of serious punishment, including 
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imprisonment.”223 The Court also distinguished Michigan’s laws from those in Smith, noting 
that Michigan’s restraints “are greater than those imposed by the Alaska statute by an order 
of magnitude” and that “while the statute’s efficacy is at best unclear, its negative effects are 
plain on the law’s face.”224 In doing so, the Court in Snyder used the same balancing test – 
Mendoza-Martinez – as SCOTUS, but came to an opposite conclusion. In a recent lower 
court decision affirmed by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, Willman v. U.S. Attorney 
General, the Court clarifies that the decision in Snyder “has no bearing on the 
constitutionality of SORNA” because Snyder “only addressed the constitutionality of 
Michigan’s [parallel law]” which included residency and other spatial restrictions which do 
not exist in the federal mandate.225 
Michigan is not alone in asserting its sovereign power to come to a different legal 
conclusion according to state law. Six other state supreme courts – Oklahoma, Maryland, 
Ohio, Indiana, Maine, Alaska, and Missouri – have found that retroactive application of sex 
offender registration laws went against their state constitutions since the Smith decision.226 
It should be noted that there is some confusion about the stance of the Supreme Court 
of Kansas. Strangely, that court released two contradicting opinions on the same day in 2016 
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– with the first opinion holding that its state’s sex offender registration statute constituted a 
punishment (and was thus an ex post facto violation), and the second opinion overruling the 
first and holding the exact opposite.227 The Kansas Supreme Court has, at least five times, 
declined to revisit the ex post facto question and the law remains in effect.228  
Importantly, though, the decision in Willman is crucial to the interaction between the 
states and the federal government: the Court held that a sex offender, even if released from a 
state’s sex offender registration requirements, is bound to still comply with federal 
regulations. The Court stated that a plaintiff who had been removed from Michigan’s sex 
offender registry “is required to comply with SORNA even though Michigan has removed 
him” from its system.229 
Other Judicial Action. There have been other notable judicial challenges regarding 
SORN and SORN-adjacent law, though these challenges range scope and scale. In 2013, the 
Court held that Congress had the authority to impose SORN registration requirements on 
those who had broken state laws created for SORN purposes.230 While the Court recently 
held that a failure to update a residence status after moving internationally was not a 
violation of federal law, it did note that the move violated Kansas law and would likely have 
violated International Megan’s Law.231 
There have been some areas of this issue in which legislation and the courts have 
decidedly begun to roll back some of the over-zealous measures against sex offenders. In 
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particular, juvenile offenders have seen modest victories in state courts regarding lifetime 
registration requirements – with the highest court in both Ohio and Pennsylvania respectively 
holding that lifetime registration requirements for juvenile offenders were unconstitutional.232 
But, even in this realm, there is much more to be done.233 
Some of the more egregious rights violations have already been halted by the courts, 
but serve as examples of the intrusiveness of the state and federal laws that proscribed them. 
Multiple courts, both state and federal, have held that the collection of Internet identifiers – 
such as usernames, etc. – violates the First Amendment.234 In Packingham v. North Carolina, 
the Supreme Court held that a North Carolina statute prohibiting registered sex offenders 
from using social media websites also violated the First Amendment.235 Being ordered to 
register as a sex offender was held by a federal court in Massachusetts to trigger the 
protections of procedural due process,236 and Utah’s highest court held that publishing 
information about an offender’s ‘primary and secondary targets’ similarly violated this due 
process.237 When underlying convictions are not sexual in nature, a Texas appellate court 
held that being ordered to register as a parole condition also violated due process.238 Very 
importantly, a federal court held that a “three-strikes” sentence based on a failure to register 
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conviction acts as a cruel and unusual punishment.239 Similarly cruel and unusual, as found 
by the Supreme Court in Georgia, is the sentence of mandatory life imprisonment for a 
second conviction of failure to register.240 That’s important to reiterate: it took a case making 
it to Georgia’s Supreme Court to claw back enacted law that would force judges to send 
people – who had already paid for their crimes – back to jail for life solely because they 
failed to register more than once. 
The primary way that SORN and similar laws are challenged in the United States is 
by using the potentially punitive aspects of the laws to argue that civil schemes – such a 
registration, SBM, etc. – are, in fact, criminal punishments. While there are several ways in 
which other Constitutional rights are impacted and argued, it appears that ex post facto 
challenges are most common. Still, as these laws expand and harshen, as they have for many 
years, the opportunity to challenge them as cruel and unusual punishment violations may 
grow as well. As it stands, these challenges provide insight into the scope and depth of state 
surveillance of sex offenders. Surveillance, however, is often legally addressed using the 
Fourth Amendment as a guiding force. Chapter Five will address any existing Fourth 
Amendment issues and discuss what potential issues may arise in the future
 
239 Gonzalez v. Duncan, 551 F.3d 875 (2008). 
240 Bradshaw v. State, 671 S.E.2d 485 (2008). 
 59 
CHAPTER FIVE: CURRENT AND FUTURE FOURTH AMENDMENT ISSUES 
Sex Offender Laws, Generally 
The surveillance of registered sex offenders at the state and federal level is, by any 
standard, immense. When it comes to ‘surveillance,’ the first stop of any legal analysis will 
likely involve what rights are at stake. Theoretically, there are a lot of ‘rights’ at play, though 
they are vague and/or possibly penumbral in nature. Do we believe, for example, that a 
person has a right to move freely? The Court has alluded to this right – such as a right to 
travel between states – but has rarely connected it specifically to a clear ‘right’ (though 
sometimes bringing in the right of due process). Does monitoring and exclusion go against 
the greater ethos of autonomous freedom that birthed the American judicial system? Many 
scholars feel that it does – though doctrinally, this is hard to pin down and the theory is often 
woven into the doctrine. 
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects the “right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures” by the government.241  
 
241 U.S. Const. amend. IV. 
 60 
Current Issues. Historically, “the Fourth Amendment has not offered purchase for 
pushback to laws regulating convicted sex offenders.”242 Recently, however, there have been 
signs of a shift in this regard. 
For many years, Fourth Amendment issues were not focused on individuals, but 
primarily on property rights.243 This changed in Katz in 1967, when the Supreme Court 
declared that “the Constitution protects people, not places” and that a search occurs when a 
person’s “reasonable expectation of privacy” is breached – regardless of a physical trespass 
upon their property.244 Charles Katz had been arrested after he was recorded making illegal 
bets over the telephone. The recording device had been positioned outside of the phone booth 
in which Katz was speaking – and Katz argued that a private phone call inside the phone 
booth was in invasive search. The Court agreed, and noted that what a person “seeks to 
preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally 
protected.”245 In Katz, the Court created a ‘reasonable expectation of privacy test’ that has 
not been replaced.246 
The next landmark decision, as it relates to the Fourth Amendment rights of those 
being monitored or tracked, came about in 2012.247 In U.S. v. Jones, police received a 
warrant to attach a GPS tracking device to Antoine Jones’ vehicle.248 In the course of the 
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investigation, the police exceeded the geographical boundaries and time limits provided by 
the warrant.249 Jones claimed that this was a Fourth Amendment violation, while the police 
argued that there was no search.250 In its decision, the Court held unanimously that this 
certainly constituted a search, but there was a 5-4 split as to the rationale behind this 
decision. The majority found that the GPS monitoring was a search due to the physical 
trespass required by the police to place the device on the vehicle, while each of the minority 
concurrences included some privacy-related rationale related to warrantless GPS surveillance 
generally.251 The Court also noted – in what has been called “the return of the trespass 
test”252 – that Katz had never intended to replace the common-law meaning that had come 
before it, but had expanded the overall protections to include both rationales. The reasonable 
expectation of privacy test in Katz, wrote Justice Scalia for the majority, “has been added to, 
not substituted for, the common-law trespassory test.”253 
Thanks, in large part, to the seismic shift in Katz and the more recent decision in 
Jones, there are many Fourth Amendment issues that now arise out of sex offender laws 
generally, with the majority focusing on SBM and home visits by authorities.  
The most notable case thus far is Grady v. North Carolina.254 Grady revolved around 
the issue of lifetime SBM in North Carolina. Shortly after Jones, Torrey Dale Grady – a 
recidivist sex offender ordered to enroll in lifetime SBM – relied on the Jones decision when 
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he argued that the SBM program was a warrantless search. While the North Carolina Court 
of Appeals rejected this argument (and the North Carolina Supreme Court declined to review 
it), the case was taken up by SCOTUS after Grady petitioned to the high court directly.255 
The Supreme Court agreed with Grady, however, and vacated the previous ruling – holding 
that “a State conducts a search when it attaches a device to a person’s body, without consent, 
for the purpose of tracking that individual’s movements.”256 The Court also found that the 
SBM program itself constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment as it “physically 
intrud[es] on a subject’s body” with the purpose of “obtaining information.”257 The Court did 
not, however, address “the ultimate question” of whether or not the search was a reasonable 
search, which would determine whether the SBM in question would violate Grady’s Fourth 
Amendment rights.258 At this point, there has been no significant follow-up to the Grady 
decision at the federal Circuit or Supreme Court levels. 
While the response to Grady in North Carolina is not necessarily representative of 
how each and every jurisdiction will respond to the 2015 ruling, it seems appropriate to use 
the case of Grady himself as a purposive example of the SCOTUS ruling’s impact on state 
affairs. Grady’s own case was headed back to the North Carolina state courts to address 
whether such a search was reasonable. Following the SCOTUS decision in Grady, the state 
had since been holding ‘Grady hearings,’ in which the State would attempt to persuade the 
trial court that its application of SBM on an individual was a reasonable one.259 The North 
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Carolina Court of Appeals had, thus far, rejected these trial court decisions, citing the lack of 
evidence provided by the State beyond the mere fact that the individual was a sex offender.260 
Grady himself was now back at the North Carolina Court of Appeals, challenging his own 
‘Grady hearing’ decision.261 The Court of Appeals, this time around, sided with Grady, with 
Judge Ann Marie Calabria writing that not only did “the State [fail] to present any evidence 
concerning its specific interest in monitoring [Grady], or of the general procedures used to 
monitor unsupervised offenders,”262 it also “failed to present any evidence of [the SBM 
program’s] efficacy in furtherance of the State’s undeniably legitimate interests.”263  
After the State appealed, the North Carolina Supreme Court actually expanded on the 
Court of Appeals decision. Writing for the majority, Justice Anita Earls found that not only 
was Grady’s SBM enrollment unconstitutional, but that “the State’s SBM program is 
unconstitutional in its application to all individuals in the same category as defendant” which 
includes unsupervised individuals who have completed their sentences but are subject to 
SBM solely for being recidivists.264 
Future Issues. What is on the horizon for sex offender laws and the Fourth 
Amendment? There is no question that Fourth Amendment issues will continue to develop in 
the areas of SBM and monitoring generally, though it is unclear how the Supreme Court 
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might weigh in on the ‘reasonableness’ standards that are left vague in its Grady decision. 
There will undoubtedly be changes across the country to SBM programs and the judicial 
processes for enrolling offenders. Even in the example of North Carolina, changing SBM 
policies may be an avenue for affecting future decisions.265  
There are a few minor paths for sex offender laws to impact the Fourth Amendment, 
though it is unlikely that they will be successful on Fourth Amendment grounds alone. For 
example, exclusion laws – such as a law stating that registered sex offenders are prohibited 
from public libraries, for example – are often defeated on other grounds (in the case of 
libraries, most likely the First Amendment). The primary path for the Fourth Amendment, 
then, is through challenging residency and other spatial restrictions. An example of this, and 
how it could – very theoretically – play out in a legal challenge is what are referred to as 
‘move on orders.’ 
Move on orders are the classic order by law enforcement to disperse loiterers – ‘keep 
it moving,’ etc. – and are sometimes referred to casually as ABH orders, or ‘anywhere but 
here’ orders. Stephen Henderson explores the concept of move on orders as a Fourth 
Amendment issue, asking whether a demand to depart constitutes a seizure of a person.266 It 
is a tricky concept because, theoretically, every exclusion is forced movement. If we picture 
public space as a general area in which we are free to move, any new rule excluding us from 
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one area – because public space within the general area is finite – requires us to be in the 
(now marginally smaller) general area. Taken to an extreme, for example, house arrest could 
be viewed through the lens of being excluded from leaving one’s property. Most of the time, 
though, this is unlikely to be a reasonable complaint. “The police, by excluding me from the 
park, are forcing me into the non-park area – and this is a seizure” is unlikely to be seen as a 
valid argument. A better argument, in the case of a park, might be the First Amendment 
argument that police are excluding someone from a protest in the park, etc. For the move on 
order as Fourth Amendment violation argument to take root and gain any amount of traction, 
the exclusionary regulations would likely have to be extreme – perhaps prohibiting offenders 
from being in almost all public spaces. 
It is clear that Fourth Amendment issues are going to arise in the context of sex 
offense law generally, though it remains to be seen exactly how it might play out in the 
courts. Still, these laws are significantly more likely to impact Fourth Amendment 
protections than registry-specific laws, as the next section will discuss. 
Registry Laws 
Current Issues. As it stands, Fourth Amendment issues related to registries 
themselves are fairly sparse. Counter to what the author expected in this regard, there has 
been very little in the way of Fourth Amendment challenges to SORN or SORN-adjacent 
community notification law. The most notable developments in this area are extremely recent 
– so recent, in fact, that they occurred during the writing of this work. 
In 2020, the Sixth Circuit considered the appeal of M.S. Willman, who challenged the 
application of SORNA itself on multiple grounds.267 One of these grounds was the Fourth 
 
267 Willman v. Attorney General of the United States, 972 F.3d 819 (2020). 
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Amendment.268 Willman sought a declaration that SORNA was unconstitutional. As for his 
Fourth Amendment argument, Willman argued that the registration itself – and the 
requirement to go in-person – rendered him ‘in custody’ during that period.269 The Sixth 
Circuit made little fuss in dismissing this shaky argument out of hand. “SORNA does not 
render Willman ‘seized,’ so his Fourth Amendment claim is not facially plausible,” the Court 
stated.270 Willman was ultimately unsuccessful in all of his arguments, including the claim 
that he was not required to register for SORNA if state law did not require him to do so.271 In 
January of 2021, the Supreme Court declined to take up the case.272 
It is unlikely that we will see much in the way of Fourth Amendment issues in 
registry-specific law, but only time will tell. Next, Chapter Six will describe and provide 
basic analysis of the South Carolina registry website in order to weave together a larger 





270 Id. at 826. 
271 Id. at 824. 
272 See Willman v. Wilkinson, 20-765, 2021 WL 231581, at *1 (U.S. Jan. 25, 2021), reh'g denied sub nom. 
Willman v. Garland, 20-765, 2021 WL 1074836 (U.S. Mar. 22, 2021). 
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CHAPTER SIX: CASE STUDY OF SOUTH CAROLINA’S SEX OFFENDER 
REGISTRY WEBSITE 
Website Design 
 This chapter will describe and attempt to qualitatively break into distinct parts the 
South Carolina sex offender registry website, which will then be analyzed through the lenses 
of the theories outlined in this thesis. The analysis finds numerous instances of labeling, ties 
to punitiveness, and an overarching series of performances by the state inherent in the 
website. Although this chapter concentrates on one state’s website, I will offer comparisons, 
where appropriate, of other states’ sex offender registry websites. 
Landing Page. The South Carolina Public Sex Offender Registry (hereafter referred 
to as “the SC Registry”) opens with a page entitled ‘Conditions of Use.’ The upper third of 
the page uses a waving American flag as its background on the left, and the South Carolina 
state flag on the right. The seal of the South Carolina State Law Enforcement Division 
(SLED) is positioned in the foreground. It reads, “South Carolina” in gold cursive writing 
“STATE LAW ENFORCEMENT DIVISION” in uppercase white serif-font, with “An 
Accredited Law Enforcement Agency” below. This aspect alone, when compared to the 
minimal-effort nameplates seen in a large majority of sex offender websites (from the 
author’s extensive experience in researching such sites) is a visual sign of intentional 
‘seriousness.’ Further, it suggests the information contained on the site is ‘official’ and 
perhaps has met specific, formal standards. 
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Below the nameplate sits a gray navigational menu with six options. The options are 
clearly marked and do not contain any drop-down lists on mouseover. The options are 
‘Geographic Search,’ ‘Name Search,’ ‘Community Notifications,’ ‘FAQs,’ ‘Resources,’ and 
‘Contact Us.’ 
In a bordered box, the landing page contains a recommended browser for best results, 
followed by a brief welcome. The welcome message says the following: 
Welcome to the South Carolina Sex Offender Registry! 
 
South Carolina has moved to a new sex offender 
management application called SORT. SORT is provided at 
no charge by the U.S. Department of Justice to the State of 
South Carolina. SORT is designed to make the sex offender 
registry process as efficient and effective as possible. This 
streamlined process also provides improved information 
sharing across all jurisdictions. SORT provides community 
notifications and automatic updates to the National Sex 
Offender Public Web Site. Other features include multiple 
photographs of the offender over time, a visual map of where 
the offender lives, a list of aliases the offender has used in 
the past, and a list of all of the sexually related offenses that 
an offender has been convicted of committing. 
 
Signing up for SORT Notifications! 
 
Citizens who were signed up on the previous system must 
register anew with SORT. This registration process is simple 
and can be done by agreeing to the “Conditions of Use” at the 
bottom of this page. On the next page, enter the code that 
appears on the page and click on “Continue”. On the next 
page, click on the “Community Notifications” link. Enter all 
of the information under the “Register for Community 
Notifications” section " and agree to the “Agreement 
Terms[.]” 
 
 It is important to make a comment that is not made clear by the preceding text. The 
Sex Offender Registry Tool (SORT) is a system offered to jurisdictions at no cost. States 
essentially wire into the system and, when it comes to creating their public-facing websites, 
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can choose from six templates or create their own design. Part of the reason that South 
Carolina was chosen for this case study is because it is both a well-resourced, highly-
operative website and because it uses tools provided by the federal government. Many 
jurisdictional registry websites, especially tribal websites, use some form of federally-
provided template. A case study on a site that was free of such influence is not meant to be 
representative of all sites. The SC registry is unique in how much intention is explicit in its 
design, and yet typical in its adoption of federal design tools. 
 Conditions of Use. One notable feature of the SC registry is its Conditions of Use 
section, which sits below the welcome message on the landing page. It is both extensive, has 
unique formatting features, and unique protections. Here is the full text: 
The County Sheriff's Offices and the South Carolina Law 
Enforcement Division update this information regularly, to 
assure that it is as complete and accurate as possible. 
However, this information can change quickly and 
information on registered sex offenders is often provided by 
the registered sex offender themselves as required by law. 
This information may not have been verified by local law 
enforcement officials at the time it is posted on the website. 
You are cautioned that the information provided on this site 
is information of record and may not reflect the current 
residence, status, or other information regarding a registered 
sex offender. 
 
Individuals included within the Registry are included solely 
by virtue of their conviction record and state law. The main 
purpose of providing this data on the Internet is to make the 
information more easily available and accessible, not to warn 
about any specific individual. 
 
[In the following paragraph, the word WARNING is bold and 
red] 
 
The following WARNING is posted pursuant to S.C. Code of 
Law §23-3-510: 
 
[The following paragraph, in its entirety, is bold and red] 
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A person who commits a criminal offense using information 
from the sex offender registry disclosed to him pursuant to 
Section 23-3-490, upon conviction, must be punished as 
follows: 
 
(1) For a misdemeanor offense, the maximum fine prescribed 
by law for the offense may be increased by not more than one 
thousand dollars, and the maximum term of imprisonment 
prescribed by law for the offense may be increased by not 
more than six months. 
 
(2) For a felony offense, the maximum term of imprisonment 
prescribed by law for the offense may be increased by not 
more than five years. 
 
For further information on any registrant listed on this 
website or if you believe that any of the information found in 
these records is in error, please contact the South Carolina 
Law Enforcement Division, Sex Offender Registry at Post 
Office Box 21398, Columbia, SC 29210, Phone (803) 896-
2601, Fax (803) 896-2311, or by e-mail at sor@sled.sc.gov 
 
South Carolina Code of Laws mandate that the South 
Carolina Law Enforcement Division develop and maintain 
the sex offender registry. The intent of these laws are to 
promote the state's fundamental right to provide for the public 
health, welfare, and safety of its citizens. Notwithstanding 
this legitimate state purpose, these provisions are not intended 
to violate the guaranteed constitutional rights of those who 
have violated our nation's laws. 
 
The sex offender registry will provide law enforcement with 
the tools needed in investigating criminal offenses. 
 
To view a copy of the laws please go to S.C. Code of Laws 
Title 23, Chapter 3, Article 7, and Sections 400 through 555 
using the following link: www.scstatehouse.gov 
 
Information on this site should not be used to unlawfully 
injure, harass, or commit a crime against any individual 
named in the registry or residing or working at any reported 





This Conditions of Use section is informative for several reasons. First, in comparison 
to dozens of other jurisdictions’ registry websites, the posting of ‘conditions of use’ is a 
rarity. Many sites rely on ‘disclaimers,’ which are functionally the same – but communicate a 
very different stance. A disclaimer is generally something that denies liability or 
responsibility. In a sense, as opposed to a warning or a conditional statement, ‘disclaimer,’ 
especially when paired with a milquetoast acceptable use policy, implies a ‘harass at your 
own risk,’ attitude.  
The fact that the SC registry not only uses a conditional format – i.e., ‘Here are your 
responsibilities if you choose to engage with this website’ – but is one of a few states that has 
a specific criminal law prohibiting use of the registry to harass or injure registrants and/or 
their associates is remarkable. This is a notably positive aspect of the SC registry that, for 
whatever faults will become apparent in other aspects of the website, deserves recognition. 
Still, it does fit into the general performative narrative that the SC registry very clearly 
exhibits: that police are ‘on the job’ and in control. By communicating severe warnings – in 
red and bold-faced letters – SLED flexes its authoritarian muscle textually and visually by 
putting both offenders and those who would abuse the information found in the registry on 
notice. This is further displayed by the second-person language – “You are cautioned” – 
when the site generally uses third-person language: a personalizing performance that reaches 
out and grabs the reader by the collar in breaking this third-person trend. 
“The sex offender registry will provide law enforcement with the tools needed in 
investigating criminal offenses” is a sentence that is out of place in the context of such a 
warning. The inclusion of this statement is a clear performance – a direct political tool – 
stating and demonstrating the value of the registry as something beneficial and/or effective 
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without providing any clarifying statements. How will it help provide law enforcement with 
the tools needed in investigating criminal offensive? Is SLED tracking the use of the 
registry? This statement, beyond performance, raises more questions than it answers. 
The Conditions of Use must be agreed upon before continuing to any page in the 
navigational menu. Selecting ‘I do not agree’ redirects to the statement, ‘To Search for the 
offenders you have to agree to the conditions.’ Clicking ‘I agree’ leads to a verification code 
(ex. a random array of letters and numbers to confirm that the user is human) which must be 
entered. This is positive from a design perspective because it ostensibly prevents website 
scraping, which is a tool that could be used by someone seeking to download identifying 
information en masse. This is an issue seen with other types of public records, such as 
mugshots: individuals’ photographs get scraped from police websites and then posted on 
private sites – and can only be removed when the individual picture agrees to pay a large sum 
of money.273 
Geographic Search. Unless otherwise selected via the navigational menu, a 
successful verification redirects to the Geographic Radius Search, which allows searches 
using combinations of Street, City, State, and Zip Code inputs to “search for sex offenders 
that live, work, or attend school within a 1-, 2-, or 3-mile radius of a specific address or 
within a specific zip code.” This is fascinating because of the duality between information-
sharing and depth of information. On the one hand, South Carolina certainly leans towards 
the less-private end of the information-sharing spectrum by allowing website users to search 
offenders living, working, and/or attending school nearby. Alternatively, the fact that the 
 
273 See Eumi K. Lee, Monetizing Shame: Mugshots, Privacy, and the Right to Access, 70 RUTGERS. U. L. REV. 
557 (2018). 
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radius maximum is logically either the size of the zip code or three miles (whichever is 
larger) stands in slight contrast to many states’ searches which can often (from the author’s 
general experience researching these sites) extend to five miles. This would, like the 
verification process, suggest that the state is posturing towards providing a large amount of 
information about a narrowly-targeted group: a user can’t see everyone in one fell swoop, nor 
can they scrape the site for data – but the records they find on their searches may be 
extensively detailed, a performance that communicates that these registrants are 
metaphorically (and perhaps physically) ‘on their (police) radar.’These searches are also 
narrower in the options they do not communicate (which can be found on other such sites), 
including ‘status’ (such as ‘registered,’ ‘non-registered,’ ‘sexual predator,’ ‘recidivist,’ etc.), 
aliases, and options to include incarcerated offenders. Again, this omission communicates 
(through performance) that the state would prefer searches to be narrow but provide a wealth 
of information on those identified in these searches. 
Results for an address search return on a Google Map embedded in the page, with 
icons for each. An icon of a house represents an offender’s home, a skyscraper icon 
represents an offender’s workplace, and a schoolhouse represents an offender’s educational 
institution. Users can click on any of these icons and see offenders’ names and addresses. 
The use of Google Maps to chart registrants may be significant, in that is represents a 
potential overlap between public and private surveillance – a partnership that itself is also a 
performance. 
Below the map, in the case of either address-specific or general zip code searches, a 
counter lists ‘Total offenders found’ with a number of search results. Under a header, 
‘Offenders,’ results are listed alphabetically using a table with four columns. The first is 
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‘Picture,’ which shows the most current photo of each offender. Underneath each photo is 
either the term ‘Adult’ or ‘Juvenile’ and ‘Tier,’ with the offender’s corresponding tier 
number. This may be confusing for some users, as ‘juvenile’ in this instance does not refer to 
the victims, but refers to whether the offender was an adult or juvenile at the time of their 
conviction. In this way, the design flaw is partially caused by lengthy registration 
requirements: an image of an apparent middle-aged man with the term “Juvenile Tier II,” for 
example, might easily be mistaken to imply that the middle-aged man has offended against a 
juvenile victim – a situation that can only arise in a system in which an offender who 
committed their offense as a minor is still required to register multiple decades later. 
Whereas law enforcement or other government actors would likely recognize the difference, 
it is unclear whether the distinction is considered by authorities to be important for other 
users of the site. 
The next column is ‘Name’ followed by ‘Aliases’ and ‘Matching Addresses.’ Aliases 
play an important role in the performative nature of sex offender registries. Most often, 
exploring a sex offender registry website shows that aliases are likely to simply consist of 
very obvious variations of names: Joseph might have an alias of ‘Joe’ or ‘Joey.’ Still, the use 
of the term ‘alias’ may conjure an image of the ‘aka’ associated by Hollywood with 
criminality (e.g., Joseph aka ‘Bones’), and further suggests that these are individuals with 
something to hide. By portraying many offenders as having ‘aliases,’ the use of language 
here appears to be part of the overall narrative presented by SLED. This usage is by no 
means, however, unique to the SC registry and the ‘aliases’ category remains on many 
registry sites.  
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Profiles. Clicking on an offender’s listing brings the user to their entry in the system. 
Their name is listed in bold, capitalized letters at the top of the page. On the left of the page 
is the offender’s most recent photo with the date of that photo. Underneath this photo is a 
small gallery of past photos, each of which will expand when clicked. In the ‘Main’ tab, the 
registrant’s name is listed, followed by aliases. Underneath this information is gender, race, 
ethnicity, and date of birth. Next, a primary address is listed. Physical description follows, 
listing height, weight, hair color, and eye color.  
Underneath the identifying information, a beige/brown box lists ‘Offenses,’ which 
includes a conviction date, the state of each conviction, the statute, and the description of the 
offense. Clicking on this description links to a simple page with ‘Offense Description’ in 
dark red. A legal description of the offense is written out as it might appear in the statute. 
Most offenses appear to be listed very clearly, though some offenses are listed fully 
capitalized and without lines between paragraphs. The full capitalization makes the already-
complex legalese difficult to read and comprehend in these instances. This appears to be a 
technical error, though, and the author will only be using the correctly-displaying offenses 
when analyzing the site as a whole.  
To the right of the ‘Main’ tab is ‘Other Addresses,’ which includes employer 
addresses, school addresses, and second homes. ‘Scars’ is to the right of ‘Other Addresses,’ 
which lists scar types, locations, and descriptions. ‘Marks,’ to the right of ‘Scars,’ is 
structured similarly, as is ‘Tattoos,’ to the right of ‘Marks.’ The final tab is ‘Vehicle 
Information,’ which includes vehicle license plate numbers in full, make, model, and color, 
as well as any information on boats. The inclusion of ‘Boat Information’ is likely a regional 
feature. 
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On each tab, there is a box below the information that says, in black text, “If you 
believe the listed information is in error, you may contact us via the ‘Submit a Tip’ button 
above.” Below this line, capitalized and in red, it reads, “THE INFORMATION PROVIDED 
ON THIS SITE IS INTENDED FOR COMMUNITY SAFETY PURPOSES ONLY AND 
SHOULD NOT BE USED TO THREATEN, INTIMIDATE, OR HARASS. MISUSE OF 
THIS INFORMATION MAY RESULT IN CRIMINAL PROSECUTION.”  
The ‘Submit a Tip’ notice refers to the top of the page, above the offender 
information. There are four buttons, each with a standard web icon beside it. ‘Return to 
Search Results,’ which takes users back to the list of offenders, ‘Back to Search Form,’ 
which takes users back to the ‘Geographic Search’ page, ‘Submit a Tip,’ and ‘Ask a 
Question.’ The ‘Submit a Tip’ option takes the user to a new page labeled ‘Offender Tip.’ At 
the top of this page the address, phone, and website of SLED is listed.  
Underneath, bolded and in grey, it reads, “To provide information on this offender 
please fill out the form below and click Submit.” Beneath this notice is the name, photo, alias, 
and primary residence of the registrant, followed by an optional box to input a user’s e-mail 
address and a larger text box to input a tip. This appears to be somewhat uncommon among 
registry sites generally. The ‘Ask a Question’ section is similarly structured. 
Name Search. The ‘Name Search’ page has inputs for first and last names. The search 
function after input is identical to the ‘Geographic Search’ page. 
Community Notifications. The ‘Community Notifications’ page displays a notice in 
bolded grey text: “The Community Notification system is available so you can be notified by 
e-mail when a sex offender registers a home, work, or school address that is near an address 
of interest to you.” Underneath this notice, the page is split vertically into two halves: one 
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side to register for community notifications, and the other to remove one’s registration for 
community notifications (the latter of which consists solely of an e-mail input box). 
‘Register for Community Notifications’ contains inputs for e-mail address, location 
address, search type (modeled from the ‘Geographic Search’ page) and the ‘Agreement 
terms.’ Underneath the ‘Agreement Terms’ box is a check-box with the words ‘I Agree.’  
The ‘Agreement Terms’ are as follows: 
The community notification system endeavors to provide you 
with electronic mail ("e-mail") information notifying you of 
certain eligible incidents or events about registered sex 
offenders that may be living, working, or attending school in 
your community. The goal of this service is solely to provide 
you with enough information to allow you, through your own 
efforts, to be more alert regarding matters of interest to you 
affecting your community. You agree to use the information 
for the intended purpose of allowing you to increase the 
precautionary steps taken by you and your family only, and 
not to redistribute the information for any illegal or 
unauthorized purpose. 
 
You agree not to sell, license, modify, distribute, copy, 
reproduce, transmit, publicly display, publish, adapt, or edit 
the information you obtain from this Web site, except as 
expressly authorized. Notwithstanding the above, you may 
print or download the materials or content of this service for 
personal, non-commercial use, provided you keep intact all 
copyright and other proprietary notices. Systematic retrieval 
of data or other content from this service to create or compile, 
directly or indirectly, a collection, compilation, database, or 
directory without written permission from us is prohibited. 
 
Address information is based on available Geographic 
Information Systems (GIS) data and represents only 
approximate placements. Offenders are required to register 
their addresses with law enforcement; therefore, the system 
may not include offenders who have provided false 
information or are otherwise not in compliance with the 
applicable laws. 
 
By registering for community notifications, you understand 
that information you are providing will be stored in order to 
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provide the notifications you request. The stored information 
is not personally identifiable and the least amount of 
information needed by us for system purposes will be stored. 
By registering, you consent to receive community 
notification e-mail messages from this system. You may opt-
out at any time by removing the registrations you previously 
submitted. 
 
The information provided is directly related to efforts by law 
enforcement agencies in tracking offenders and is subject to 
change at any time based on false information provided by 
offenders that is discovered by law enforcement officials. 
 
If the e-mail address you provided becomes inaccessible, you 
must provide a new e-mail address to us in order to continue 
receiving this service. Notifications will not be mailed or 
otherwise delivered in the event of an inoperative e-mail 
address, and we take no responsibility to contact you 
regarding defects in your e-mail. 
 
While most of these terms are fairly standard and do not directly tie into the theories 
outlined in this thesis, one portion does. “The information provided is directly related to 
efforts by law enforcement agencies in tracking offenders and is subject to change at any 
time based on false information provided by offenders that is discovered by law enforcement 
officials.” In this one line, SLED arguably shows its hand, demonstrating all three theories 
outlined in this work. By stating that any error in the registry results from false information 
provided by offenders, SLED is saying three things. Performatively, the statement says that 
the police are above any and all error – despite multiple disclaimers throughout the terms, not 
once does it warn about administrative, technical, human, or other error by SLED. In fact, it 
ties labelling theory in by putting the future blame on the offenders – ‘offenders,’ not 
‘registrants’ – and furthers moral panic and populist punitiveness by implying that the police 
are always hard at work to discover the lies being told by offenders. 
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Frequently-Asked Questions (FAQs). The FAQ page addresses eleven questions. 
Some are answered with legalese (including Latin-based legal terms like nolo contendere, 
and writ of habeas corpus) in massive blocks of single-spaced text with no indentions or 
other paragraph markings. The first question, for example, ‘What is a Sexual Offender,’ is 
1,299 words with no spacing between any lines. These ‘legal’ answers are also littered with 
citations throughout and were difficult for the author – someone who has been studying these 
specific laws for almost two years – to understand. The following questions were answered 
in this style: ‘What is a Sexual Offender,’ ‘Who is required to register,’ ‘I am a registered sex 
offender from another state and plan to visit South Carolina[] . . . Am I required to register,’ 
‘Can a sex offender be removed from the registry,’ ‘What information is required in 
jurisdiction’s sex offender registries,’ ‘What information must be available to the public 
through public websites,’ and ‘Can a registered sex offender live near a school?’ 
The remaining questions are answered with some legalese mixed in but are largely 
readily understandable and more succinct. The questions ‘What is a Tier II offender,’ and 
‘What is a Tier III offender’ simply describe the categories of those tiers and list the 
requirements for each. What is extremely telling about these answers, however, is not in the 
use of language, but in the copying of it. The SC registry uses direct language taken from the 
federal guidelines described in Chapter Three – the guidelines that the author described as 
encouraging jurisdictions to apply stricter registration requirements in lieu of creating their 
own tiered categories. The question ‘What is a Sexually Violent Predator,’ a seemingly 
important definition due to the extreme language and the imagery it conjures, is not fully 
answered. Beyond giving the time requirements for how often this group of registrants must 
be photographed, etc., the only definition provided is “[a] person determined by a court to be 
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a sexually violent predator pursuant to state law[.]” The question ‘Can sex offenders have a 
social media account’ is answered quite succinctly (the answer being yes).  
Resources. Underneath a clickable button to call the National Child Abuse Hotline, 
the ‘Resources’ page contains a series of links with between one and four links under each of 
the following categories: ‘Adult Sexual Abuse and Family Violence Resources,’ ‘Legal / 
Investigation / Legislation / Advocacy,’ ‘Preventing and Responding to Child Abduction,’ 
‘Preventing and Responding to Child Abuse Resources,’ and ‘Preventing and Responding to 
Computer Facilitated Crimes and Child Sexual Exploitation.’ Most of the links provided are 
to non-profit or governmental organizations that are fairly standard and certainly appropriate, 
though there is no indication of how these sites/resources have been vetted. Are these 
resources intended to serve as extensions or proxies for the work done by law enforcement 
or, performatively, are they a demonstration that SLED works with reputable organizations? 
One link, under ‘Preventing and Responding to Computer Facilitated Crimes and Child 
Sexual Exploitation,’ directs to a non-profit called Enough is Enough,274 which the Office for 
Intellectual Freedom of the American Library Association has called an “anti-porn 
evangelical” group.275 All of the resources linked on the ‘Resources’ page are directed 
towards victims, parents of victims, and parents concerned about children. 
Contact Us. The ‘Contact Us’ page looks very similar to the ‘Ask a Question’ and 
‘Submit a Tip’ portions of the offender profiles, though they do not contain the information 
about any specific offender. There are input boxes for users’ names, e-mails, and 
questions/feedback. There are no further links or pages on the SC registry. 
 
274 Enough Is Enough, www.enough.org 
275 Brian M. Watson, NCOSE’s Dirty Dozen Censorship, INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM BLOG (The Office for 
Intellectual Freedom of the American Library Association) (2019). 
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Chapter Seven will attempt to tie this analysis into the larger context and apply the 
theoretical base of this thesis to the SC registry. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: DISCUSSION 
Analysis 
 Origins. From the outset, the forced registration of people in the United States has 
come from a place of fear and bigotry. First, with Chinese exclusion – a dark time in our 
nation’s history – which sought to utilize cheap labor while refusing the humanity of the 
laborers. It is truly unnerving to consider that the ubiquity of carrying photo ID may have 
originated as a ploy to apprehend individuals of Asian descent when they were not carrying 
their papers and deport them. Labeling and populist punitiveness are on full display during 
this period, with the labeling coming in paper form and the punitiveness resulting in abuses 
that would likely have horrified Americans were they to be inflicted upon most other groups 
of people.  
Homophobia. This shameful history continued with registration in California first for 
gang activity and then the early sex offender registries. As discussed, these ‘sex crimes’ 
registries were largely a means to prosecute homosexual men, with a majority of arrests 
coming from consensual gay activity. In this regard, the labeling effect is quite clear: by 
grouping homosexuals with sexual predators – and grouping the resulting combination with 
criminal gangs, the respective governments created a class of undesirables – a group that 
could be seen as the collective font of social ills in the community while also communicating 
disgust and shame to those labeled as deviants. Further, these registries – being paper-based 
and without the adequate tracking technology to be very useful – were largely performative. 
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There is seemingly no rational way in which early registries would have been plausibly 
useful in addressing actual issues, beyond keeping a list of easy suspects already disliked by 
the community and law enforcement. This performance served the dual function of both 
informing the public that the police were addressing the moral panic they were experiencing 
(and their social anxiety about homosexuality) and communicated to the homosexual 
community that it, in no uncertain terms, was not welcome.  
Modern Legislation. We continued to see populist punitiveness re-emerge in the 
1990’s during the overhaul of the sex offender registry system from a sparse patchwork of 
internal registries into the public-facing behemoth that it is today. Scoring political points by 
stoking the fears fueled by rare, but horrific instances – the gruesome murder of a child, for 
example – legislatures represented all sex offenders as a monolithic, equally-contemptable 
group not only through the legislative effects of their bills, but in the names of the bills 
themselves. The vast majority of notable laws involving sex offenders, both federal and state, 
have the names of children in them (Megan’s Law, Jessica’s Law, etc.), “which achieves an 
essential message about the law it represents .”276 The problem here is that “simple messages 
are also vulnerable to sweeping generalizations” and in this case, “the generalization is clear: 
each sex offender, no matter the conviction, is painted with the same broad brush as the 
violent sexual predator who killed Megan … [which] conjures up a host of malevolent 
images regarding sex offenders.”277 Further, the increase in laws – with names evoking 
horrific crimes – signaled to the public that crime was escalating.278 
 
276 Catherine L. Carpenter, Legislative Epidemics: A Cautionary Tale of Criminal Laws that Have Swept the 
Country, 58 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW 1, 24-27 (2010). 
277 Id. 
278 Id. at 38. 
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Federal and State Law. The most performative aspects of sex offender registration 
policy would come in the form of SORNA and its accompanying federal guidelines. The 
majority of the regulations use language that is both aggressive in its policies and glibly 
dismissive of the rights of the individuals affected by them. Whether it is smirking 
‘scoreboard’ style list of failed legal challenges to SORNA that the DOJ includes in its 
annual report, to the many instances of ‘suggesting’ ways that states ‘may choose’ to take the 
mandate to even more intrusive heights, it appears that the federal government wastes no 
opportunity in treating people’s lives – and their rehabilitation – like a game rigged in its 
favor. 
The analysis of the SC registry suggests that at least some states are following this 
line of encouragement, not only considering the guidelines, but utilizing them directly on the 
registry websites themselves. The SC registry, under both ‘What is a Tier II offender,’ and 
‘What is a Tier III offender’ in its FAQ section, copies the exact verbiage used in the federal 
guidelines – in particular, the rationalization for broad, sweeping requirements to satisfy the 
federal mandate without needing to individualize offenders. The passage is as follows: 
“Rather, the SORNA requirements are met as long as sex offenders who satisfy the SORNA 
criteria for placement in a particular tier are consistently subject to at least the same 
minimum duration of registration, frequency of in-person appearances for verification, and 
extent of website disclosure that SORNA requires for that tier.” In terms of the analysis, 
taking parts of the guidance verbatim and using them on its own site would appear to be 
evidence that the state found the guidelines’ rationale to be compelling. However, it is 
important to note that many states – for an array of reasons – are not SORNA compliant. 
While they may rely on SORNA as a guiding principle, the actual number of states that are 
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fully in compliance with all (or even most) aspects of the law is very small. Despite this, the 
law’s influence is pervasive – and still sets the standard for many state laws. 
Challenges. Legal challenges to SORNA and SORNA-adjacent laws reveal two key 
points. First, challenges to state SORNA-adjacent laws, such as residency restrictions, 
monitoring, exclusion, etc., reveal the level of overreach that the states have attempted – 
which can be viewed through the lens of populist punitiveness and police performance. The 
populist punitiveness, of course, is on display with the (since-challenged) egregious 
restrictions put upon juvenile offenders in many states. If a state, in good faith, is ready to 
enroll a child in lifetime registration and potentially monitoring – especially when there is 
little to no evidence as to the efficacy of such enrollment – there is clearly some aspect of 
moral righteousness and fear. As to performative policing, these moves – when unchallenged 
– perform a message of invulnerability and strength on the part of law enforcement. Voting 
against these laws – or ruling against them as a judge – can also be seen as soft on crime, and 
the performative value of standing up for the rights of sex offenders is not very popular in 
American politics. Secondly, these challenges offer a potential path forward for sex offender 
registry reform, which will be discussed in the conclusion. 
Fourth Amendment Issues. On the issue of registry law itself, the author admittedly 
began this thesis with the belief that there might be more to discover in this area. 
Unfortunately, there have been very few registry-specific claims made, addressed, or even 
remarked-upon in the judicial space. The recent ruling – which rejected such an argument on 
its face, flatly stating that registration is not a Fourth Amendment violation – is evidence that 
registry-specific claims are unlikely to succeed on Fourth Amendment grounds.  
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On the issue of registry-adjacent law, however – particularly SBM – there is much 
abuzz. The cases reveal  compelling evidence of performative policing and populist 
punitiveness. For example, ankle monitors used in SBM are clearly performative aspects of 
policing. Similar to a perp walk or mug shot, “the traditional ankle monitor is an archetypal 
display of criminality. It is sufficiently entwined into the American cultural consciousness, 
being regularly referenced in popular culture and satirized in social media, as to be easily 
recognized by most members of the public.”279 By conjuring this image through performative 
policing, law enforcement creates a dichotomy in which the archetypal criminal is ‘bad,’ 
which necessitates the jailer as ‘good.’280 Further, the visuality of the monitor – and perhaps 
why this aspect of the technology has unnecessarily remained unchanged – enables it to 
“operate as a stigma symbol that casts the wearer as ‘a criminal’ in the eyes of the public and 
makes them vulnerable to prejudicial treatment.”281 Much like the term ‘sex offender,’ which 
can be imprecise, “there is no visual differentiation among what types of monitors are used 
for different types of wearers.” This lack of clarity casts wearers as simply “subjects worthy 
of surveillance in the eyes of the public.” In this way, “wearing an electronic ankle monitor is 
viscerally akin to being made to wear a criminal record on one’s body.”282 
The South Carolina Registry. Just as performative policing in deeply involved in the 
use of ankle monitors, the registry website itself – at least the one studied in this work – 
provides another opportunity to see police performance in action. The professional design of 
the site belies many performative aspects, such as professionalism and organization. The 







links that can be made between the theories studied and the site itself. First, it is - like most 
registry sites - akin to looking at a “Most Wanted” bulletin. Despite the rational fact that 
everyone on the site is accounted for, there is a very real, creeping sensation that one is 
looking at some sort of fugitive database – that these are dangerous people ‘to watch for.’. 
This appears to be by design: the photos are not mugshots (which we might associate with 
‘capture’ or ‘incarceration,’ but are instead simply recent, unsmiling photos. The sea of 
expressionless faces further communicates (potentially inaccurate) subtleties about the 
community of sex offenders. Additionally, the ‘marks and scars’ aspect of the site seems 
intended more for a fugitive hunt – with the traditional reason for this information being 
provided in order to recognize someone on the run (e.g., ‘Be on the lookout for a man with a 
rectangular scar on his left thigh’). The ‘Submit a Tip’ function also orients the registry as 
some sort of fugitive watch: soliciting ‘tips’ heavily implies that there is some key 
information that is unknown to the police - in particular because it may be falsified or 
withheld by the offender. This point is built up in writing later, as discussed, in the disclaimer 
– which blames all inaccurate data on ‘false information’ provided by offenders. The ‘Submit 
a Tip’ function also implies a contract or partnership between the public and the police – you 
help us and we’ll help you: we’re in this together.  
One notable point is on the ‘Resources’ page, where the organizations listed are 
intended for use by victims. This communicates that resources offered for direct services to 
offenders, which might address similar needs, such as mental health care. This performs the 
value that offenders – even on the site that lists their most private information – are not 
worthy of rehabilitation. The performance, this way, is that of caretaker: valued community 
members are directed to services; offenders are registered and restricted. In terms of labeling, 
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the registry site continually uses some combination of red, boldfaced, and uppercase text to 
mark offenders – using the actual term ‘offenders’ repeatedly throughout.  
The relationship between the politicians and law enforcement agencies, which rely on 
each other for legitimacy and mutual performative power, utilizes the sex offender registry as 
part of an almost formulaic performance of ‘order, chaos, and order restored’ – signaling that 
‘we are in control, there was a moment of disarray and danger, but we have retaken control 
and dealt with the chaos.’ 
The Path Forward 
 So where do we go from here? It is clear that a history of bigotry, political fear-
mongering, and law enforcement performance continues to drive the expansion of 
registration schemes. It is also clear that the federal government wields (and enjoys wielding) 
the most influence in this process. The author suggests that state courts asserting their 
autonomy against increasingly punitive federal sex offender laws may be one path in the 
direction of meaningful reform. As the federal government continues to expand these laws – 
and they inevitably collide with the state constitutions – we may see a growing trend of states 
standing up to SORNA regulations as against the interests of their states. This may well lead 
to further federal challenges. As it stands, there is not much of a path forward for ex post 
facto claims, as Smith makes this exceedingly difficult to overcome. Public opinion is 
unlikely to change – especially as neither states nor the federal government make much effort 
to justify regulations on the basis of efficacy. This area – particularly textual analysis on 
registry sites and study on their function as law enforcement media tools – deserves further 
research. Nearly a million people around the country are registered sex offenders – yet there 
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